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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Chris Chambers for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Computer Science presented November 6, 2006.
Title: Addressing Cheating and Workload Characterization in On-Line Games
The Internet has enabled the popular pastime of playing video games to grow
rapidly by connecting game players in disparate locations. However, with popular-
ity have come the two challenges of hosting a large number of users and detecting
cheating among users. For reasons of control, security, and ease of development,
the most popular system for hosting on-line games is the client server architec-
ture. This is also the most expensive and least scalable architecture for the game
publisher, which drives hosting costs upwards with the success of the game. In
addition to the expense of hosting, as a particular game grows more competitive
and popular, the incentive to cheat for that game grows as well. All popular on-
line games suffer from cheats in one form or another, and this cheating adversely
affects game popularity and growth.
In this dissertation we follow a hypothetical game company (GameCorp) as it
surmounts challenges involved in running an on-line game. We develop a charac-
terization of gamer habits and game workloads from data sampled over a period
of years, and show the benefits and drawbacks of multiplexing online applications
together in a single large server farm. We develop and evaluate a geographic redi-
rection service for the public server architecture to match clients with servers. We
show how the public server game architecture can be used to scalably host large
persistent games such as massively multiplayer (MMO) games that previously used
the client server architecture. Finally we develop a taxonomy for client cheating in
on-line games to focus research efforts, and specifically treat one of the categories
in detail: information exposure in peer-to-peer games.
The thesis of this dissertation is: a methodology for accurate usage modeling of
server resources can improve workload management; public-server resources can
be leveraged in new ways to serve multiplayer on-line games; and that informa-
tion exposure in peer-to-peer on-line games is preventable or detectable with the
adoption of cryptographic protocols.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On-line gaming is a popular pastime around the world. A current chart of the
growth of massively multiplayer online (MMO) games demonstrates population
growth in an exponential phase [84]. While such a growth rate is unlikely to
continue for long, surveys suggest that video games represent a modern-day gener-
ation gap, similar to the “rock and roll” gap of the 1960’s: while 50% of Americans
play video games, 75% of the gamers are under 40 years old [85]. We believe on-
line gaming will be an increasingly popular activity over the next few decades as
it spreads to new areas of the world and popular media devices such as console
platforms and cell phones [1]. Furthermore, we believe games are valuable not
only as a popular venue for entertainment, but also because of the contributions
game developers can make towards computer science research. Efforts to make
better computer games have driven advances in computer graphics visualization,
networking and scientific computation [75, 19, 59].
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While there is a lot of growth and potential capital at stake in the on-line gaming
industry, there is also a great deal of risk. A decade ago it was not unheard-of for a
game made by a few people in their spare time to become popular and successful.
By contrast, today’s on-line games have development budgets similar to Hollywood
movies and the operating expenses of hosting a 24-hour a day service for potentially
hundreds of thousands of users. The high development costs for a game do not
guarantee a return; indeed, only a small percentage of published games thrive.
In this thesis, we take the point of view of a fictitious game publisher called
GameCorp as it considers how to host a successful on-game while avoiding the
huge development and maintenance costs and addressing the prevalence of cheat-
ing associated with modern on-line games.
1.1 Research Challenges
Two central issues associated with on-line games are hosting and cheating. In
the hosting problem, the issue is one of scalability and popularity: how can a
game architecture be built to support subscribers ranging across many orders of
magnitude? The popularity of a game depends on influences outside a game archi-
tect’s control, such as market forces. A hosting solution requires many tradeoffs in
server resource allocation, game responsiveness in terms of user interactivity, and
the amount of computation performed at the client. Adequately provisioning for
2
a game is challenging as the host is caught between expensive hosting resources
(servers, bandwidth, support), demanding users and the unknown initial popular-
ity of a game.
Cheating is another challenge for on-line games. Clients are in control of their
own machines, which are running a portion of the game code. By modifying the
game however they see fit, cheaters are able to achieve numerous advantages over
other players. These types of advantages range from fabulous wealth, to perfect
aim, to being able to see through walls or outrun speeding bullets. While industry
efforts to fix the problem have made some progress at preventing cheating, every
popular on-line game suffers from cheats of one sort or another. As the stakes
have become higher in these games, cheating has grown more prevalent and more
debilitating. For persistent on-line games, this cheating amounts to essentially
stealing money from other players or from the game company, and can quickly
ruin a virtual world’s economy. For any game, the presence of cheaters detracts
from the play experience of others, decreasing the satisfaction of the cheat-free
population, ultimately to the detriment of the game’s popularity.
1.2 History
In order to understand on-line gaming, some historical perspective is useful. The
history of on-line gaming is as brief as the history of computer networking. One of
3
the earliest known examples of networked gaming was Spacewar, a two-player game
written for the University of Illinois PLATO network in 1969 by Rick Blomme.
The PLATO network utilized 512x512 access monochrome graphics capabilities
and connected players at low latencies.
On-line gaming throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s typically involved networked
games over the PLATO network, or variants of them ported to the UNIX platform.
Some examples of these are MUDs, xtrek, and Zork. In the early 1990’s the
proliferation of Internet connectivity across universities and the popularity of Id
Software’s Doom, a first-person perspective shooting game, marked the rise of
on-line gaming in popular culture. Doom was not designed to be played over
the Internet, but rather on a local area network (LAN). However, demand for
play was great enough that the game was retrofitted to be compatible with LAN
emulator tools such as Kali that made play over the Internet possible. This game
was nearly unplayable over a modem connection due to latency and reliability
assumptions in the networking code. Id’s next game, Quake (1996), was designed
to use the Internet Protocol from the ground up and attempted to smooth client
gameplay experience with client-side prediction. Quake was popular enough to
hold tournaments for thousands of dollars of prizes and get millions of people to
invest money in consumer graphics cards for games. On-line gaming has only
gotten more popular since that time, and further driven advances in specialized
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networking, user-input, and even furniture devices designed to enhance the gaming
experience. Today, a modern popular game played on-line can garner hundreds of
thousands of players per day, and there are dozens of such games.
Academic research into on-line gaming covers a diverse set of research disciplines,
such as artificial intelligence [9, 22] human-computer interaction [14], economics [27],
computer graphics[7, 26, 63], security [6] and networking [32, 15, 13]. The overlap
of networking research and games research is of particular interest to us. Networked
gaming research has covered topics such as effects of latency on user performance,
player characterization, traffic characterization, wireless gaming, hosting infras-
tructure for games and cheat detection and prevention.
1.3 Introducing GameCorp
In this thesis we take the perspective of GameCorp, an imaginary company in the
business of publishing successful on-line games. GameCorp knows there is tremen-
dous success to be had in the market. For instance, a single large on-line game,
World of Warcraft, retains over 6 million subscribers paying monthly fees ($US 15
in the United States). However the market for on-line games is extremely com-
petitive, with many games released to little acclaim or success, despite enormous
development and initial launch costs, and substantial recurring maintenance and
content development costs. In addition to the usual challenges of creating and
5
selling a good product, GameCorp faces three special difficulties. First, the on-line
gamer is an infrequently studied entity whose behaviors are relatively unquantified.
GameCorp resolves to gain more knowledge about the average gamer by studying
the network-observable behaviors and challenges faced by average gamers. Sec-
ond, the architecture used to host modern on-line games is expensive and scales
poorly. GameCorp resolves to develop an alternate architecture for hosting games
that scales. Third, modern on-line games are plagued by a bewildering variety of
cheats. GameCorp resolves to address cheating in on-line games.
Broadly, it is our intention to show techniques by which the state of the art in
hosting games and preventing cheating can be advanced. We view this as important
both for the continued success of on-line gaming as well as for the shared advances
between on-line games and other applications. Interactive on-line applications
of many sorts, such as military or disaster simulations, distance learning, and
interactive storytelling share overlap with the networked aspects of on-line games,
and technologies and results garnered from advances in gaming can benefit these
other applications as well.
1.4 Thesis Overview
GameCorp is creating a compelling game to be hosted and played on-line, and
would like to release it. However, there are two central challenges GameCorp must
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address: how to cheaply host the game and how to ensure there are no cheats that
will ruin the game. We summarize GameCorp’s investigation by chapter.
• Chapter 2 addresses the characterization of gamers and game server work-
loads, with the intention to determine ways of decreasing hosting costs. We
evaluate player characteristics such as attention span and loyalty to a server
as well as game server characteristics such as load variation and load peri-
odicities. We evaluate and reject the hypothesis that multiple client server
games can be efficiently hosted on the same hardware.
• Chapter 3 explores a promising alternative to the client server hosting model:
public server. While the public server model allows for user hosting and user
content, thereby alleviating the publisher’s workload, it does not allow for a
large-scale gameplay experience and it burdens users with a server selection
task. We present a design allowing for large-scale gameplay in the public
server model, as well as a geography-based redirection service to address the
server selection problem.
• Chapter 4 provides an overview of cheating in on-line games and introduces
our classification of all client-side cheats into four distinct categories. We
7
then treat a specific category (information exposure) in greater depth and
present the protected real-time strategy protocol for decreasing information
exposure in peer-to-peer games. We show the performance characteristics of
protected RTS via game trace driven simulation.
• Chapter 5 summarizes our results and outlines future research.
8
Chapter 2
Characterizing Game Workloads
2.1 Introduction
On-line gaming is an increasingly popular form of entertainment on the Internet,
with the on-line market predicted to be worth over $5 billion dollars in 2008 [25].
As an example of a popular, money-making game, EverQuest [30] has over 450,000
subscribers paying a monthly fee and purchasing expansions. Unfortunately for
game companies such as GameCorp, the success of a game is highly unpredictable.
To make matters worse, there are substantial costs in developing and hosting on-
line games. As a result, such companies are increasingly exploring shared, on-
line hosting platforms such as on-demand computing infrastructure provided by
companies such as IBM and HP [46, 48, 86, 39, 47, 62, 78, 81]. In this chapter
GameCorp undertakes a study of the efficacy of such an approach.
In order to judge the feasibility of large-scale game multiplexing, it is important for
9
GameCorp to understand how gamers and game workloads behave. Understand-
ing the behavior of players, the predictability of workloads, and the potential for
resource sharing between applications allows infrastructure to be tailored to the
needs of games. While there has been a substantial amount of work characterizing
web and peer-to-peer users and workloads [21, 40], there is very little known about
game players and workloads.
In order to provide insight into such issues, this chapter examines several large
traces of aggregate player populations of popular games as well as the individual
player population of a busy game server. We present a detailed analysis of on-line
game players and workloads that targets several key areas which are important to
game and hosting providers including:
• How easy is it to satisfy gamers?: One of the key issues in providing a suc-
cessful game is to understand how players connect to servers and how long
they play on them. By understanding what players are willing to put up
with, game and hosting companies can tailor their infrastructure and con-
tent to maximize player satisfaction. For example, one of the challenges with
using on-demand computing infrastructure for games is the latency associ-
ated with re-purposing a server. It would thus be useful to characterize how
patient game players are in connecting to a game before deploying such in-
frastructure. To this end, we characterize individual player behavior of an
10
extremely popular Counter-Strike game server over a long period of time.
Our results show that gamers are an extremely difficult set of users to satisfy
and that unless game servers are properly set up and provisioned, gamers
quickly choose to go elsewhere.
• How predictable are game workloads? Another problem in hosting on-line
games is determining the amount of hardware and network bandwidth that
is required. Hosting a game is an expensive proposition, costing the game
provider more than 30% of the subscription fees in just hardware and band-
width per month [68]. Hosting is made all the more difficult by variations of
popularity as the game moves through its life cycle. Game companies face the
provisioning problem both in determining the amount of resources to provide
at launch time and in allocating spare resources to support dynamic usage
spikes and subscriber growth. Characterizing the diversity and predictability
of game workloads allows companies to more accurately provision resources.
To this end, we examine the real-time aggregate game player population of
more than 550 on-line games. Our results show that game popularity follows
a distinct power law distribution making the provisioning of resources at
launch-time extremely difficult. However, as games mature, their aggregate
populations do become predictable, allowing game and hosting companies to
11
more easily allocate resources to meet demand.
• Can infrastructure be shared amongst game and other interactive applica-
tions? With the advent of commercial on-demand computing infrastructure,
it is becoming possible to statistically multiplex server resources across a
range of diverse applications, thus reducing the overall hardware costs re-
quired to run them. In order for such shared infrastructure to provide any
savings, peak usage of applications must not coincide. To characterize the
amount of sharing benefit that is available, we examine the usage behavior
of a number of popular on-line games and compare them against each other
and against the usage behavior of several large distributed web sites. As
on-demand infrastructure is distributed, we also examine the client load of a
number of servers based on geographic region. Our results show that usage
behavior of interactive applications follows strict, geographically-determined,
time-of-day patterns with limited opportunities for resource sharing.
Section 2.2 describes the methodology behind our study. Section 2.3 analyzes
properties of individual gamers. Section 2.4 describes trends of on-line gaming
in aggregate. Section 2.5 evaluates the potential for multiplexing games and web
traffic together, and Section 2.7 discusses our conclusions.
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cs.mshmro.com trace
Start time Tue Apr 1 2003
End time Mon May 31 2004
Total connections 2,886,992
Total unique players 493,889
GameSpy trace
Start time Fri Nov 1 2002
End time Fri Dec 31 2004
Total games 550
Total player time 337,765 years
Steam CDN trace
Start time Mon Sep 27 2004
End time Mon Apr 8 2005
Content transferred 6,193 TB
Average transfer rate 3.14 Gbs
Table 2.1: Data sets
2.2 Methodology
The study of on-line game usage is typically limited due to the proprietary nature
of the industry. To overcome this, we have collected several unique data sets that
allow us to analyze properties that have not been possible previously. These data
sets include the following:
Individual player data: In order to study the behavior of individual players playing
a representative on-line game, we examined the activity of one of the busiest and
longest running Counter-Strike servers in the country located at cs.mshmro.com [66,
33]. Counter-Strike (a Half-Life modification) is currently the dominant on-line
game with the largest service footprint of any game at 35,000 servers and over 4.5
13
billion player minutes per month [3]. Of all of the active Counter-Strike servers,
cs.mshmro.com is among the busiest 20 servers as ranked by ServerSpy [79]. The
server averages more than 40,000 connections per week, has hosted more than
400,000 unique players in year 2004, and has logged more than 60 player years in
activity since its launch in August 2001. Table 2.1 describes the trace collected
from the server.
GameSpy aggregate player population data: One problem with measuring on-line
game usage is the limited access to game server hosting data. Game companies
typically keep the access and usage behavior of their players confidential. There
are two factors that enable the measurement of aggregate game player populations,
however: (1) on-line games use a centralized authentication server to keep track
of the players that are playing and (2) information on overall player numbers
per game is usually exported publicly. Several game portal services collect such
player numbers over a large number of games and report the information in real-
time. Among these services is the GameSpy network, which provides real-time
player population data on individual games in a structured format that can readily
collected and analyzed [36]. Currently, there are over 550 on-line games that are
being tracked across various genres including first-person shooter games (FPS),
massively multi-player on-line role-playing games (MMORPG), real-time strategy
games (RTS), card and board games, and sports games. To study on-line game
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population behavior, we have collected a data feed from GameSpy for more than
two years since November 2002. Our redundant collection facility periodically
samples the GameSpy data every 10 minutes. Note that the availability of the
data is sensitive to many factors, including service outages at the portal and our
own outages. These outages have been manually removed from the data analysis.
Table 2.1 describes the data set which includes over 50 million measurements and
represents more than 300,000 years of player time spent on games over the course
of a two year period.
Content-distribution networks : One of the common features of on-line games is
their ability to dynamically update themselves. To support this feature, many
games employ custom, game-specific, content distribution networks that deliver
new game content and software patches to clients when needed. One such network
is Steam [87], a multi-purpose, content-distribution network run by the Valve cor-
poration which is used to distribute run-time security modules as well as client and
server software patches for Half-Life and its mods such as Counter-Strike and Day
of Defeat. The network consistently delivers several Gbps of content spread across
over 100 servers. In order to analyze the resource usage of Steam, we have collected
its data feed over a 6 month period, a duration that has seen Steam deliver more
than 6 petabytes of data. Table 2.1 describes the trace collected.
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2.3 Gamers As Individuals
It is important for game providers to understand the usage behavior of its players in
order to adequately address their needs. In order to study player characteristics,
we analyze the trace of cs.mshmro.com to track individual gamers throughout
their play cycle. Specifically, we track gamers attempting to connect to the server,
gamers playing on the server, and the likelihood of a gamer returning to the server.
We first demonstrate that gamers are difficult to please. In particular, they 1) have
no tolerance for busy servers, often connecting once while the server is busy and
never reconnecting again for the entire trace, 2) have very specific gameplay needs
and if those needs are not met in the first few minutes of play, their likelihood
of continuing to play at the server drops off dramatically, and 3) they often have
no loyalty or sense of community tied to a specific server and do not return after
playing a handful of times. For those that do return often, we also demonstrate that
their session times show a marked decline and their session interarrival times show
a marked increase just as they are ready to quit playing on the server altogether.
2.3.1 Gamers Are Impatient When Connecting
Quantifying the patience of on-line gamers is important for adequate server provi-
sioning. For some Internet applications, such as web-browsing, users are known to
be impatient [12]. For others, such as peer-to-peer services such as Kazaa, users
16
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Figure 2.1: Player impatience based on acceptable refusal ratio
are very patient [40].
Our trace of cs.mshmro.com records successful connections as well as connection
attempts, when players connect to the server and are refused service. The lat-
ter is extremely common; every day, the server turns away thousands of people.
Browsing the trace, it is not unusual to see the same player reconnect to the server
several times in a row, waiting for a spot on the server to free up. We operate on
the assumption that a player’s willingness to reconnect to the same busy server
repeatedly is an indication of their patience.
In order to quantify player patience we calculate for each player their total number
of gaming sessions on the server and their total number of failed attempts to play,
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Figure 2.2: Session time results for cs.mshmro.com trace
and compute the ratio as an indicator of the number of acceptable refusals per
player. Figure 2.1 shows the probability distribution of acceptable refusals per
player. As the figure shows 73% of the players are unwilling to reconnect to the
server even once. One of the reasons players do not reconnect is that game clients
have a “Quick Start” mechanism that many players use. The mechanism works
by downloading a list of candidate servers from the master server and cycling
through them one by one until a successful session is established. Thus, such
clients may not lack patience, but rather are automatically redirected elsewhere.
For the rest of the players, however, 13% are willing to reconnect one time on
average with the percentage sharply decreasing with successive refusals. Aside
from the first data point, the rest of the graph represents a client’s patience in
connecting to our busy server and, not surprisingly, can be fit very closely with
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a negative exponential distribution. As Figure 2.1 shows, a negative exponential
distribution with parameters α = 0.4648 and β = 0.6456 fits the data with a
correlation coefficient of 0.999. Players, therefore, exhibit a remarkable degree of
impatience with busy game servers.
2.3.2 Gamers Have Short Attention Spans
Using the same trace, we extracted the total session time of each player session
contained in the trace. Figure 2.2 plots the session time distributions of the trace
in unit increments of a minute. The figure shows, quite surprisingly, that a sig-
nificant number of players play only for a short time before disconnecting and
that the number of players that play for longer periods of time drops sharply as
time increases. Note that in contrast to heavy-tailed distributions reported for
most source models for Internet traffic; the session ON time for game players is
not heavy-tailed. To further illustrate this, Figure 2.2(b) shows the cumulative
density function for the session times of the trace. As the figure shows, more than
99% of all sessions last less than 2 hours.
Unlike the player patience data, session times can not be fitted with a simple
negative exponential distribution. However, the data can be closely matched to
a Weibull distribution, a more general distribution that is often used to model
lifetime distributions in reliability engineering [74]. Since quitting the game can be
19
viewed as an attention “failure” on the part of the player, the Weibull distribution
is well-suited for this application. The generalized Weibull distribution has three
parameters β, η, and γ and is shown below.
f(T ) = β
η
(T−γ
η
)β−1e−(
T−γ
η
)β
In this form, β is a shape parameter or slope of the distribution, η is a scale
parameter, and γ is a location parameter. As the location of the distribution is at
the origin, γ is set to zero, giving us the two-parameter form for the Weibull PDF.
f(T ) = β
η
(T
η
)β−1e−(
T
η
)β
Using a probability plotting method [74], we estimated the shape (β) and scale (η)
parameters of the session time PDF. As Figure 2.2(a) shows, a Weibull distribution
with β = 0.5, η = 20, and γ = 0 closely fits the PDF of measured session times for
the trace.
This result is in contrast to previous studies that have fit a negative exponen-
tial distribution to session-times of multiplayer games [44]. Unlike the Weibull
distribution which has independent scale and shape parameters, the shape of the
negative exponential distribution is completely determined by λ, the failure rate.
Due to the memory-less property of the negative exponential distribution, this rate
is assumed to be constant. Figure 2.3 shows the failure rate for individual session
durations over the trace. As the figure shows, the failure rate is higher for flows of
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shorter duration, thus making it difficult to accurately fit it to a negative exponen-
tial distribution. While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for this, it could
be attributed to the fact that Counter-Strike servers are notoriously heterogeneous.
Counter-Strike happens to be one of the most heavily modified on-line games with
support for a myriad of add-on features [41, 4]. Short flows could correspond to
players browsing the server’s features, a characteristic not predominantly found in
other games. As with player patience, it may be possible to fit a negative expo-
nential for longer session times. As part of future work, we hope examine this as
well as characterize session duration distributions across a larger cross-section of
games to see how distributions vary between games and game genres.
2.3.3 Gamers Are Not Loyal
Public-server games such as Half-life provide users with a large choice of servers
located all around the world. Gamers can switch between servers as often as they
like. Some reasons to continue playing on the same server are simplicity, a known
low-latency connection, preference for server options, or a sense of community. It
is natural to wonder whether servers continue to serve the same group of clients
and to what extent these reasons or others keep clients at a specific server.
Our trace contains the connection records for each client via their unique player
identification number (WONID). We quantify loyalty to the server by counting
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trace
the number of times a player returns to play after a successful playing session.
Figure 2.4 shows, on a logarithmic scale, the cumulative distribution of additional
game sessions per player for players who returned at least once to the server. As
the figure shows, 42% of the players in our trace returned to play only once and
81% played less than 10 times. On the other hand, the top 1% of loyal gamers
return to play many thousands of times (hence the logarithmic scale). It appears
that the majority of clients have very little loyalty to public servers, and only a
small fraction have grown strongly attached. We hypothesize that, due to a large
population of servers to choose from (over 30,000), clients rarely select the same
22
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of additional sessions
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Figure 2.4: CDF of sessions per player on the server
server twice.
2.3.4 Gamers Reveal When They Lose Interest
Players of a game have some discretion about how frequently they play a game and
for how long. Players often lose interest in a game and cease playing altogether
at some point. Before that happens, however, there may be noticeable indica-
tions that their interest is waning. Such indications are extremely useful to game
providers who can detect waning interest and react to it on a macroscopic level
with new content or on a per-player basis via customized incentives for continued
play.
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Figure 2.5: Player behavior throughout their playing careers
We determine the average player interest curve by calculating each player’s se-
quence of play sessions from their first session to their last recorded session. This
is a player’s play history. Since each player may progress through his or her game
interest at a different rate, we normalize each of these data sets based on the dura-
tion each player is active on the server. We then examine the average session times
and session interarrival times of all players throughout their playing careers. Fig-
ure 2.5(a) shows that player session times are relatively constant halfway through
their play history and fall off to just more than 50% of the initial session time
before the player loses interest completely. Figure 2.5(b) shows that the time be-
tween player sessions is minimized before the halfway point and increases steeply
until the player’s interest has fully waned. We conclude that player session times
and session-interarrival times can be used as an early indicator of peaking player
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interest and that game publishers should use these measurements to trigger the
delivery of new content or incentives for the individual player.
2.4 Game Populations
As shown in Section 2.3, under-provisioning resources for a game can quickly drive
gamers away. Over-provisioning, on the other hand, can be costly. We look at two
facets of gaming integral to successful game provisioning: overall game popularity
and predicting game workloads. We show that (1) there are, and will be, very few
extremely popular games, and (2) game workloads are periodic and predictable
over short-term intervals.
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Figure 2.7: Player load for three popular games over a 4-week period
2.4.1 Game Popularity Follows a Power-law
To determine the distribution on-line game popularity, we analyzed the GameSpy
data set described in Section 2.2. By averaging the number of players per game
over the trace, we ranked each game based on its popularity. Of the games, we
consider only the top 50 games, as the remaining games averaged a minimal number
of players throughout the trace. Figure 2.6 shows the popularity data on a log-log
scale. As the figure shows, this distribution is very heavily skewed in favor of the
most popular games, with the first ranked game having over ten times the number
of players of the next most popular. This distribution of popularity is most similar
to a power-law distribution. Power-law distributions are of the form y = axλ
and occur in a number of places including the frequency of words in the English
language, the popularity of web pages, and the population of cities. An intuition
for these distributions is that whenever choices are made between many options,
and each choice affects other choices, the choices tend to pile up on a few popular
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selections. A perfect power-law distribution would graph as a straight line on a
logarithmic scale in both the x and y axis. The relatively straight line (correlation
coefficient -0.98 for a simple linear regression) demonstrates that the GameSpy
data does follow a power law distribution. This distribution has an interesting,
albeit unfortunate, implication for provisioning server resources for on-line games:
the host must plan for several orders of magnitude of change in popularity (and
therefore resources) in either direction. As a result, this indicates that on-demand
infrastructure can significantly reduce the costs and risks of launching and hosting
on-line games.
2.4.2 Game Workloads Have Varying Degrees of Predictability
Accurately predicting game workloads allows game hosting providers to allocate
the appropriate amount of resources for a game. In order to determine whether this
is feasible, we analyze the GameSpy trace for different sets of games. Specifically,
we investigate whether any simple trends or patterns can be used to accurately
predict the game workload, whether the workload is stable and if so, over what
time scale.
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Figure 2.8: FFT of the player load from four games over one year.
Game Workloads Exhibit Predictable Daily and Weekly Changes
Intuitively, it is reasonable to assume that usage is strongly tied to the daily and
weekly activities of players. Figure 2.7 shows the global player population of four
consecutive weeks starting from 3/1/2003 for three popular games: America’s
Army, Half-Life, and Neverwinter Nights. As expected, the figure shows that the
workload has regular daily cycles and that over this one month period the workload
does not vary significantly from week-to-week. In fact, for all three games, the
trends as well as the maximum and minimum points match up at identical points
in time during the week. We observe similar results over other parts of the year
with the only anomalies caused by service outages and by holidays. To further
28
-100 -50 0 50 100
Percent change
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
PDF of load changes
Fitted T-location-scale (   =-0.9092     =5.4507     =1.574)µ σ ν
Figure 2.9: Instantaneous week-to-week PDF of percent load changes for the top
5 most popular games of 2004
demonstrate the cyclical nature of gaming workloads, we take one year’s worth
of game server load samples across a variety of games and plot the Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) of the data. The FFTs have been scaled so that they can be
plotted together. As Figure 2.8 shows, the FFT contains strong peaks at the 24-
hour cycle for each of the games. There is also a significant peak at the 168-hour
(one week) cycle for two of the games as well. This corresponds to an increase in
player usage on the weekends during some parts of the year. Papagiannaki et. al
use wavelet multiresolution analysis (MRA) on another long-term data series [72],
and model their series as a 12-hour and 24-hour cycle plus a trend. We were unable
to apply this technique however, due to the reliance of wavelet MRA on resolutions
that are factors of two apart. The difference between our two cycles is seven.
In order to quantify the week-to-week variation of game workloads, Figures 2.9,2.10,2.11
show the distribution of week-to-week load changes of the top 5 most popular
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Figure 2.10: Mean week-to-week PDF of percent load changes for the top 5 most
popular games of 2004
games during 2004: Half-Life, Battlefield 1942, Medal of Honor: Allied Assault,
America’s Army, and Neverwinter Nights. Figure 2.9 plots the distribution of in-
stantaneous load changes between identical points in time of consecutive weeks,
while Figure 2.10 plots the change in average daily load between the same day
of the week of consecutive weeks. Finally, Figure 2.11 plots changes in maximum
daily load between the same day of the week of consecutive weeks. The figures
fit a ‘t’ location-scale distribution, which has three parameters, a scale parameter
σ > 0, a location parameter µ, and a shape parameter ν > 0. The density function
for this distribution is as follows:
f(x) =
Γ(ν+1
2
)
σ
√
νpiΓ(ν
2
)
(
ν + (x−µ
σ
)2
ν
)−
v+1
2
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Figure 2.11: Max week-to-week PDF of percent load changes for the top 5 most
popular games of 2004
Note that if x is ‘t’ location-scale distributed, x−µ
σ
is Student’s ‘t’ distributed with
ν degrees of freedom. As illustrated in Figures 2.9,2.10,2.11 we find a very good fit
for all the three plots. Based on this observation, we draw two main conclusions
with regard to resource usage:
• As the figures show, almost all week-to-week load variations are under 10%
of the previous week’s workload. Such behavior makes it relatively easy for
game and infrastructure providers to provision and predict resource usage on
a weekly basis.
• Further, the above distribution fitting of load variations indicates that it
is feasible to model the week-to-week load variations using such standard
distributions. We are exploring the feasibility of online parameter estimations
for using this model in the resource provisioning.
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Figure 2.12: Population trends for Half-life and other games after daily and weekly
cycles are removed
Game Workloads Exhibit Unpredictable Long-term Fluctuations
While the daily and weekly cycles in server load are clear, the duration of our
trace allows us to examine longer term cycles. We examine the trend of the most
popular game, Half-life, as well as three games of similar popularity over the period
of just over two years. We compute the trend as the moving average of the data
with a window size of one week. Figure 2.12 shows the trends of the respective
games. The underlying trend of these games does not reveal periodicities on a
monthly timescale, and the limits of our trace prevent us from drawing any strong
conclusions about annual cycles. There are several points in trace where the games
appear to be synchronized, but the explanation for the concurrent peaks or valleys
is not necessarily predictable. We observe peaks in all games near the Christmas
season, but, for example, all four games experience a drop during the unpredictable
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weeks of the Sobig virus [16].
2.5 Impact on Infrastructure
With the movement toward hosted game services [65, 29] as well as on-demand
computing infrastructure for games such as Butterfly.net [10], there has been a
great deal of interest in reducing the cost of running game servers by sharing
server resources dynamically across multiple games and applications. We explore
two likely scenarios: hosting multiple games on the same servers, and hosting
web sites along with game servers. In addition, we study the usage behavior of a
content-distribution network for supporting games. Our results show that there are
significant challenges in multiplexing interactive applications on the same server
infrastructure and that only limited opportunities for reducing peak resource usage
exist.
2.5.1 Game Workloads are Synchronized
There are two ways games can be multiplexed with each other. One way would be
to coarsely and statically assign physical servers to particular games based on the
popularity of the game. Results from Section 2.4 clearly show that this can provide
a lot of benefit for game companies. Another way would be to dynamically re-
allocate servers based on instantaneous demand for a particular game. An implicit
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Game Average number of players
Half-Life 80324
America’s Army 5791
Battlefield 1942 5402
Neverwinter Nights 4579
Table 2.2: Mean player populations for week of May 23, 2004
assumption that gives value to the latter method is that different games have
usage patterns that are substantially different. Thus, rather than have each game
provision server resources based on the peak usage of their game, server resources
would be provisioned for the global peak.
In order to investigate the extent to which different games can be multiplexed with
each other, we examined the aggregate player populations of four popular games
that span several genres. The games examined included FPS games (Half-Life,
Battlefield 1942, and America’s Army), as well as an MMORPG (Neverwinter
Nights). Player populations of these games were collected over a one week period
(Sunday May 23, 2004 to Saturday May 29, 2004) from the GameSpy trace. In
order to compare the games directly, independent of their popularity, each game’s
population data was normalized by the mean population for that particular game
during the week. Table 2.2 lists the mean player populations for the four games
examined. Figure 2.13 plots the normalized player loads for the four games during
the one week period. As the figure shows, player populations fluctuate significantly
based on the time of day from lows close to half of the mean to peaks close to twice
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Figure 2.13: Aggregate normalized load across four popular games for week of May
23, 2004
the mean. In addition, populations across games have peaks in close proximity to
each other, making it difficult to achieve significant statistical multiplexing gain
between different games. Finally, as indicated in the FFTs from Figure 2.8, games
show slight peaks on the weekends with slightly more players on-line than during
the week.
2.5.2 Games and Interactive Application Workloads are Synchronized
While Section 2.5.1 shows the difficulty in obtaining statistical multiplexing gain
between different games, on-demand computing infrastructure could still be useful
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North American cereal manufacturer
Start time Mon Aug 13 2001
End time Sun Aug 19 2001
Total requests 10,368,896
Content transferred 59.6 GB
North American credit card company
Start time Tue Aug 14 2001
End time Mon Aug 20 2001
Total requests 112,590,195
Content transferred 366.4 GB
International beverage manufacturer
Start time Tue Aug 14 2001
End time Sat Aug 18 2001
Total requests 11,932,946
Geographically resolvable 11,829,429
Content transferred 51.1 GB
Table 2.3: Web site logs for week of August 13, 2001
for multiplexing between other applications such as web servers. In order to exam-
ine this, we obtained web server logs over a week for three commercial sites. The
sites included those for a North American cereal manufacturer, a North American
credit card company, and an international beverage manufacturer. Table 2.3 de-
scribes the traces of the web servers, all from the week of August 13, 2001. The
servers themselves were located in geographically distributed data centers and the
individual logs from each site were aggregated and sorted into a single log file.
Using these traces, we plotted the normalized load for the web server against the
normalized global aggregate load of Half-Life during the same week in August
2004.
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Figure 2.14: Aggregate normalized load between Half-Life and North American
cereal manufacturer website
As Figures 2.14,2.15,2.16 show, workloads for web and on-line games share similar
daily periodic peaks. This particular week of game traffic does not have a strong
weekend rise (perhaps due to being from the summer), but the web traffic does
slump during the weekends as Figures 2.14 and 2.15 show. Interestingly, Half-life
shows considerably less variance than the North American websites, but similar
variance to the international beverage manufacturer website. Intuitively, it makes
sense that applications and web sites with global usage patterns are more consis-
tently busy and have less daily variance. Due to the international popularity of
Half-Life, its usage pattern is quite similar to that of the international beverage
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Figure 2.15: Aggregate normalized load between Half-Life and North American
credit card company
company’s web site. Overall, these results indicate that infrastructure sharing be-
tween applications during the week will have a somewhat limited benefit with some
potential for multiplexing gain during the weekends and during the “off hours” for
geocentric applications.
2.5.3 Games Exhibit Strong Diurnal Geographic Patterns
One of the salient features of globally distributed, on-demand computing infras-
tructure is that it can easily shift resources geographically close to where the
demand is coming from. Intuitively, it makes sense that a predictable, diurnal
pattern drives global resource consumption and hence, the provisioning of server
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Figure 2.16: Aggregate normalized load between Half-Life and International bev-
erage manufacturer
resources. This is especially the case for applications that require human partici-
pants such as games. To study this phenomenon, we examined a one-week period
of cs.mshmro.com (Sunday May 23, 2004 to Saturday May 29, 2004). Using this
log and a commercial geographic IP address mapping tool [38], the location of
each player connecting was resolved. As Table 2.4 shows, a significant portion of
the load is from outside of North America. Using the resolved connections, the
per-continent load normalized by the mean connection arrival rate was plotted. As
Figure 2.17 shows, each continent shows a predictable, diurnal pattern of activity
with the only difference being a time-zone shift. It is interesting to note that in
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Total connections 71,253
Geographically resolvable 30,226
From North America 9,414
From Asia 9,814
From Europe 8,788
From other continents 2,210
Table 2.4: Connection data for cs.mshmro.com for week of May 23, 2004
contrast to the Half-Life aggregate load and international beverage company web
site load shown in Figure 2.16, the per-continent load of cs.mshmro.com exhibits a
large variance similar to the North American web site loads shown in Figures 2.14
and 2.15. We hypothesize that when the usage patterns of international servers
and services are broken out into individual regions, the resulting load variances are
similar to those of regional servers such as the cereal manufacturer and the credit
card company.
To test this hypothesis, we compared the per-continent load between cs.mshmro.com
and the international beverage company web server trace 1. Figure 2.18 shows the
per-continent, normalized load of the game and web server for North America
and Europe. The load from other continents shows similar results. As expected,
the per-continent load fluctuations and variance are similar to those found in the
two regional web sites. The figure also shows that usage of both applications are
1Note that a much larger percentage of the IP addresses in the beverage company trace is
resolvable. This is due to the fact that the trace (and the set of IP addresses in it) is much older,
giving services such as GeoBytes more time to identify their locations
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Figure 2.17: Aggregate normalized load per-continent for cs.mshmro.com
highly synchronized when broken down into geographic regions. The degree of syn-
chronization thus limits the benefits that geographically distributed, on-demand
computing infrastructure has on interactive applications such as games and web.
2.6 Game Updates Significantly Impact Resource Usage
The infrastructure required to host on-line games must also account for the mu-
tability of the games over time. Software patches to fix bugs, prevent cheats,
and deliver new content to end-users are an expected component of many on-line
games. These patches can vary greatly in size, from a few bytes to several gi-
gabytes. Understanding the impact of these patches on hosting, and adequately
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Figure 2.18: Normalized load for cs.mshmro.com and the international beverage
company website
provisioning for them is an important part of supporting on-line games. We use
the trace of the Steam content delivery network to examine this aspect of games.
Our Steam trace includes the initial download of the popular FPS game Half-Life
2 as well as a number of sizable content updates for both clients and servers.
The Steam network is utilized for both player authentication and content distribu-
tion. Players are authenticated to Steam for each game session, via the download
of an authentication module. Content is distributed to players (and servers) via
Steam at irregular intervals and irregular sizes. These two functions are not distin-
guished in the data set we have collected. However, we can differentiate them by
utilizing the GameSpy dataset, which tracks player load, by assuming that player
load and game authentication are linearly correlated.
As a way of validating that the Steam data and the GameSpy data are tracking
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the same thing (i.e. player load), we consider a week without a Steam update.
Figure 2.19 shows a scatter plot of Steam data (in megabits per second) versus
GameSpy data (in players), and the least-squares fit line. The correlation coeffi-
cient for this week is 0.86, indicating a roughly linear relationship. We attribute
the inexact nature of the correspondence to small changes in the size of the au-
thentication module and sampling error.
We use the GameSpy dataset to subtract away the authentication data from Steam
and focus on the bandwidth requirements of a patch. Figure 2.20 shows a two week
period of Steam activity, with a single patch occurring three days into the period.
Also graphed is the authentication data component, computed from the GameSpy
dataset with a ratio of players to megabits/second of 1 to 0.0291. By integrating
these two signals and subtracting, we estimate the patch burden on Steam for
this patch to be 129.7 terabytes, which is 30% of that week’s total load including
authentication.
We use this same methodology on four patches delivered during our trace, and chart
the bandwidth impact of the patches over a two-week period in Figure 2.21. Three
anomalies deserve explanation: patch p3 is cut short of the full two week period
analysis because of the release of p5, patch p2 shows a rise in bandwidth after one
week due to erroneous player data from GameSpy, and (according to Steam’s press
releases) the two weeks of patch p7 contain numerous patches. One question to
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Figure 2.19: Half-Life player population versus Steam CDN usage
address is how long it takes to deliver a patch: the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the patch delivery data in Figure 2.22 shows that 80% of the load occurs
in the first 72 hours for the three single-patch traces, whereas the various patches
in trace p7 are delivered throughout a two-week period.
Our observations on patch distribution bring up several issues. We believe content
delivery for games is a significant burden that must be provisioned for, as it can
greatly increase the hosting bandwidth requirement. At this point, however, it is
unclear what the optimal strategy would be for delivery and scheduling. Our initial
observations are that to avoid the stacking effect seen in Figure 2.22, content should
be spaced for delivery such that the bulk of each patch is delivered before the next
patch begins. Further, if minimizing the combined content and authentication load
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Figure 2.20: Steam bandwidth during a patch release
is a goal, then patches should be released at the lowest peak in the weekly and
daily cycle. For example, a patch released Monday evening may potentially miss
the daily afternoon peak as well as the weekend peak. As part of future work,
we plan on examining the proper scheduling of patches based on measured game
workloads.
2.7 Conclusions
On-line gaming is an increasingly popular form of entertainment on the Internet.
Unfortunately, effectively hosting on-line games is a difficult, expensive proposition
made more onerous by the lack of workload models for games or known charac-
teristics of gamers. Due to the unpredictable nature of the popularity of a game,
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Figure 2.21: Excess bandwidth consumed by users downloading patches via Steam
combined with the high barrier to entry for hosting, a number of academic and
industry projects have focused on providing a shared on-demand infrastructure to
solve the hosting problem.
To understand the benefits of such infrastructure, this chapter presents a com-
prehensive analysis of on-line game players and game usage data collected from
a number of unique sources. Our results show that gamers are difficult to satisfy
throughout the gameplay process: they are likely to leave and never return if they
can’t connect, they are likely to leave within the first few minutes if they don’t
enjoy the server’s characteristics, and they are unlikely to become loyal to a server.
In addition, game popularity follows a power-law distribution, with a small num-
ber of games having orders of magnitude more players than the rest. This makes
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Figure 2.22: Cumulative distribution function of patch data.
resource provisioning very difficult for the initial release of a game when popularity
has not been established and provides a promising area where shared hosting can
provide benefit. Although initial provisioning is difficult, our results also show that
once established, game workloads are relatively stable from week to week, allowing
game providers to more easily allocate resources to meet demand. In addition, we
determine that game workloads are synchronized amongst themselves and other
interactive applications and that they follow strong diurnal, geographic patterns.
Such synchronization makes it difficult to obtain statistical multiplexing gain be-
tween games and other interactive applications when using shared infrastructure.
Finally, we show that game software updates provide a significant burden on game
hosting and must be scheduled and planned for accordingly.
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These conclusions paint a grim picture for the GameCorp goal of hosting an on-line
game, as a game host must substantially overprovision their servers to cope with
the daily peak of game traffic, as well as provision for the unknown initial game
popularity, knowing that underprovisioning will result in frustrated gamers likely
to quit. GameCorp takes these results as evidence that an alternate architecture
for hosting should be explored.
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Chapter 3
Public Server Games
In this chapter we describe the attractions and drawbacks of the public server
architecture as compared to the more popular client-server architecture. The pub-
lic server model scales more easily by relying on user-supplied hosting and user-
generated content, but requires users to perform a difficult server selection task
and does not allow for authenticated persistent content across public servers. To
make the public server model more appealing, we introduce a geographic redirec-
tion service to address the server selection problem and a design for a public server
MMO that allows for persistent content across public servers.
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, GameCorp performed a measurement-based characterization of games,
players and game workloads with an aim towards decreasing hosting costs by host-
ing many games on the same centralized server farm. Unfortunately, the study
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concluded that multiplexing gain across games or other interactive applications
was unlikely to be of much benefit, due to synchronized workloads. In this chap-
ter we investigate what can be done to leverage the public server architecture
to address hosting costs. We first provide an overview of alternate architectures
and game popularity in order to further motivate the hosting challenge, and then
present the two problems we address in this chapter: server selection and persistent
content on public servers.
On-line games can be broken down into one of three types of network architectures.
In client/server, the game publishers operate game servers that host the game.
The clients perform all communication with the company-controlled server. This
architecture is relatively well-controlled compared to the other two types: peer-to-
peer and public server. In peer-to-peer, there is no central server, or alternately,
one of the peers playing the game is also the server for the game. In public server
games, the code to run a game server is widely distributed, and anyone who likes
may run a game server, or shut off their server on a whim.
On-line games of all architectures are enormously popular pastimes throughout the
world. As of 2006, the dominant first-person shooter (FPS) game Half-life averages
over 100,000 players concurrent players at all times, or over 9,000 player years
played per month [87]. Casual games such as those played over MSN Zone [64] post
similar concurrency numbers, and massively multi-player on-line (MMO) games
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such as World of Warcraft claim over 6 million subscribers paying monthly fees [90].
Figure 3.1 shows the steep growth in subscribers to MMO’s since 1998 as compiled
by Bruce Woodcock [84]. The games with the three largest contributions are
Lineage, Lineage 2, and World of Warcraft.
Figure 3.1: MMO subscriber growth over time by game
As the prospective host of a popular on-line game, GameCorp can expect to pay
many costs. Direct costs include bandwidth, power and the amortized cost of
the server machine itself. Indirect costs include continued content development,
player support, as well as information technology support such as operating system
maintenance and network maintenance. As the number of players increases, or
their level of demands increase, these costs increase as well. An extreme example
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of difficulty in hosting is a popular MMO game. The commitment required to
introduce a new MMO game is daunting; a popular game must have support at
the server level for millions of simultaneous transactions, with server response-time
needing to be as rapid as possible for a satisfying customer experience. The servers
must be up 24 hours a day to support the global customer base. A large staff of
game support staff must be constantly present to handle voracious customer needs,
such as technical support, in-game errors, or reports of abuse. New content must be
released for the persistent world regularly, meaning that it must be in development
all the time. The supporting infrastructure required for a massive game to succeed
is made all the more onerous by the fact that the on-line game market is extremely
competitive and many games fail to generate revenue and are canceled.
Because of the scalability issues, large recurring costs and risk associated with
hosting, GameCorp would like to investigate alternate architectures to mitigate
these factors. The public server architecture is especially attractive to GameCorp
because it oﬄoads the burdensome requirement of hosting the game logic, dispute
arbitration and network bandwidth to the public at large. Public server games such
as Half-life and Neverwinter Nights [8] have demonstrated that users are willing
to host games themselves, with their own servers and maintenance efforts. For
example Half-life typically has around three thousand full servers, three thousand
partially full servers, and eighteen thousand idle servers. These servers are all
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maintained by the Half-life gaming community, without any resources from the
game company.
Furthermore, public server is an ideal architecture to allow for user generated
content, as the users are running both the servers and the client themselves. In
addition to granting players the ability to run game servers, game developers typ-
ically allow players to modify the game servers in specified ways, creating mods
that add additional content to the game. Users are very willing to create new
content for games that they can serve. For instance the number of mods created
for Neverwinter Nights (over four thousand) dwarfs the game content expansion
created by the game developers (seven).
The public server architecture simultaneously eliminates the costly hosting expense
of an on-line game and also provides an avenue for greatly extending the life-cycle
of the game via user-created content. However, the public server architecture has
some problems. First, there is no persistent data shared across public servers, and
the number of players that can be hosted on a given user’s computer is typically
small, for example from ten or twenty for a first-person shooter, to around one
hundred for the lower processing requirements of a text-based MUD. This means
that people desiring a massively multi-player on-line experience will likely be less
interested in a public server game. In addition to scalability issues, with tens of
thousands of servers to choose from, finding a server with the desired gameplay can
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be challenging. Players must solve this problem amidst a changing set of servers
each time they want to play the game.
GameCorp would like to build a public server architecture that addresses these two
drawbacks of (1) small-scale gameplay without persistent content and (2) difficulty
finding a server to play on, and use it for the next big on-line game. In Section 3.2
we address finding a good server in the public server architecture, and in Section 3.3
we address the issues of persistent content and “massiveness” in the public server
architecture.
3.2 Public-server Games and Geographic Redirection
3.2.1 Server Selection and Overflow Connections for FPS Games
In the public server model, the standard technique for a client to find a suitable
server to play on is to first download a list of all of the currently registered servers
from the central registry. An automated process then contacts each one of them
(or sometimes just a random subset) and retrieves important information about
the server, such as how many players are playing, what the latency is to the server,
and what map is being played. The player can then sort this list locally by any
criteria and connect to their chosen server. Unfortunately, such mechanisms do
not scale, do not work effectively, and consume a significant amount of bandwidth
for a popular game with hundreds of thousands of players and tens of thousands
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of servers.
In this section we address the issue of server selection in the public server set-
ting. We build on the work of the Internet measurement community whose efforts
have made it possible to locate an IP address geographically in the world as well
as estimate the latency between two arbitrary IP addresses [57, 52, 70]. One
problem closely related to ours is that of server selection for content distribution
networks [58, 80]. The key difference between the server selection problem for
public-server games and the problem for content distribution is the unstable set
of servers for public-server games. In the content distribution problem, the set of
distribution nodes is typically under the provider’s control or known to be stable.
Our focus is on the FPS game of Counter-Strike due to its popularity, the large
number of deployed servers, and the fact that we have access to an extremely
popular server for the game. Some background on FPS games is helpful for this
discussion. The typical FPS game is a user controlling an avatar on a given map
(such as a building), exploring the map to find enemy player and engaging in a gun
shoot-out. The games are small-scale, with typically under twenty people playing
on a given public server. For FPS games such as Counter-strike, latency is a strong
determinant in user satisfaction [5, 44, 42, 43]. Because of this, it is imperative
that clients can easily find and connect to servers that are close to them. However
latency is not a client’s only concern; they may also care about the map, server
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Figure 3.2: Overflow connections on cs.mshmro.com 6/17/03-6/19/03
rules, or other individual server characteristics. These client concerns make the
server selection problem for public-server games unique as compared to content
distribution or anycast. The server selection problem for a client is therefore to
find a server that meets the client’s needs (latency and otherwise) in a scalable
fashion. In order to address this problem, we have designed and implemented a
centralized geographic redirection service to connect players and servers.
To demonstrate the efficacy of our approach, we modified the Counter-Strike game
server for an extremely popular gaming destination, cs.mshmro.com, so that it
transparently redirects players based on their geographic locations. For reasons
that are not completely clear, some public servers are enormously popular while
others languish. Some explanations include network positioning, word of mouth
reputation, server rules, or something biased in the black-box algorithm used by
Half-Life’s “Quick Start” button. cs.mshmro.com is forced to turn away over 2000
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Figure 3.3: Overview of redirection service architecture
people per day simply due to being full. Figure 3.2 shows a map of the world with
a line drawn between cs.mshmro.com and every client who tried to connect but
found the server full during a 48 hour period (there are 5400 lines). Ideally, full
game servers would be able to redirect potential clients to other servers, perhaps
to servers even better suited to the client needs.
3.2.2 Methodology
Our service provides a scalable, centralized redirection architecture by which servers
with high load can, instead of dropping clients when full, redirect the clients to a
server that meets client needs, as well as improving the overall connectivity of the
network. The management of where these clients go is handled by a redirection
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master, a service that can be located anywhere on the Internet. We envision the
application of this service to any public-server game, such as Quake, Half-Life, or
Neverwinter Nights, as well as any network service that runs on a large number of
geographically distributed servers (i.e. a geographic “anycast”).
Figure 3.3 provides an overview of our architecture, and the three-step process
players go through to be directed to a good service. In (1), players connect to
a Counter-strike server running our redirection plugin. In (2), the Counter-strike
server contacts the redirection master, submitting the player’s IP address, and
receiving a good server for that player in return. In (3), the Counter-strike server
reconnects the player to the good server.
In order to match clients with servers, geographic positioning information is used
to locate a server that is in the same region (say, continent) as the client. As
seen in Figure 3.2, clients often select servers very far from home, even when there
are similar servers nearby. Our geopositioning information is obtained from a
commercial tool [38], which has a success rate in obtaining GPS data from client IP
addresses of over 60% for Counter-Strike traffic to our server [34]. Redirection is not
performed on addresses that cannot be mapped. The mapping tool itself is being
updated continuously, presumably increasing its success rate and thereby allowing
for broader participation in redirection over time. In addition to geographic data,
we need to know which servers are currently running, which ones are usable, and
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where they are located.
Many current public-server games have a master server which tracks all of the
game servers, for licensing purposes as well as to aid players in finding a server.
A plethora of tools exist to enable gamers to contact this centralized registry and
download the list of game servers. We use QStat [73], which can also contact a
server and retrieve its characteristics. We define a server as “good” when it is up,
not full, and has game rules that match the game rules we define as important.
For this study, we only considered one game rule to be critical, which was the
rule allowing play without a password. Surprisingly, around 40% of all randomly
selected Counter-Strike servers are protected with a private password. Our goal
is to redirect players who cannot play on a server to a likely candidate server in
their own region of the world. In addition to a ruleset we also partition the world
into a distinct set of geographic regions, with the goal being to maintain a list of
valid servers for each such region. Our service can allow for more game rules to be
considered at the cost of maintaining more valid servers per region.
The redirection master periodically retrieves a listing of all registered servers and
performs geographic lookups on each of them, categorizing each server into a par-
ticular region of the world, and storing this information in a database. This is
done daily, and serves to capture a rough view of the available registered servers
for the day. This process can take up to an hour.
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In addition to being time consuming, polling the servers once a day gives us little
assurance that these servers are still up several hours later and tells us nothing
about how full the server is at any given moment. To address these issues, we
frequently (every 5 minutes) select a subset of servers from our large list to be
redirect target servers, 5 per region, and verify them to be good. These are the
servers to which clients are redirected to when our server is full. The frequent
verification of this list gives us some measure of confidence that the servers are
still good, although it does not establish any guarantees.
Reducing the list of servers to just a few select redirect servers updated every few
minutes has several benefits. First, it reduces the amount of polling and processing
required by the redirect master. Second, it allows the service to fill up the redirect
servers, giving players on those servers close to the same game play that they
would have experienced on the original server. Finally, it allows for scalability of
the service; by measuring the number of redirection requests in the last few time
periods, provisioning of adequate redirect servers for the future can be performed.
As an added optimization we utilize an Internet tomography tool called King,
which computes latency between two arbitrary IP addresses on the Internet by
using recursive DNS lookups [53]. Using King we establish the approximate latency
between the client and each of the redirect servers in the client’s region, and direct
them to the best server.
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Name # regions Date range Redirects
e1 7 6/17/03 - 6/19/03 7173
e2 50 10/30/03 - 11/11/03 7303
Table 3.1: Redirection experiments
Overall, our system centralizes the work of collating and continually verifying the
list of redirect servers per region. In order for a game server to participate in
client redirection, all that is required is the installation of a small server plug-in
which contacts the redirect master and receives a redirect server given the client
IP address.
3.2.3 Evaluation
In order to evaluate our scheme, we utilized two Linux servers, one running Half-
Life’s Counter-Strike mod on cs.mshmro.com and the redirect plug-in, and the
another running the redirect master. The game server’s redirection plug-in was
written in Small [4], and the management of the redirect master was implemented
as a set of perl modules storing data in a MySQL database (the same database
with the geographic IP lookup).
We perform two experiments, detailed in Table 3.1. Both experiments redirect
around seven thousand clients over a period of a few days, and represent an attempt
to test the same redirection service with varying region size. To illustrate the
redirection process, Figure 3.4 graphically shows the locations to which refused
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Figure 3.4: Redirected connections on cs.mshmro.com 6/16/03-6/17/03
players were routed over experiment e1, as well as explicitly delineating the regions.
To establish the relative merits of our redirector we evaluate it on two criteria:
distance and latency.
Distance
One metric used to determine the effectiveness of this redirection service is the
savings in overall network efficiency: kilobit-miles. As shown in [32], a typical
Counter-Strike player utilizes 56kbps of network traffic. If a player was playing
over a two mile link, and was rerouted to a server one mile closer, the network
would save 56 kilobits per second of traffic over a one mile link, or 56 kilobit-
miles. Since converting between kilobit-miles and miles is a constant conversion
for Counter-Strike traffic, we simply measure miles saved. It is important to note
that these are extra miles of links which gameplay traffic no longer has to traverse,
and furthermore these savings have a dimension in time for as long as the player
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plays. While miles saved and network latency saved are only roughly related, it is
expected that with the continued build-out of Internet infrastructure (in terms of
exchange points and last-mile links), the correlation will increase.
By logging each client’s location, c, and the location of the server, s, to which they
were redirected, and with the knowledge of the server location at o, the number
of miles saved can be calculated by computing the great circle distance between
c and o, and subtracting the distance between c and s. Using the radius of the
Earth r, we compute the geometric formula for the distance between two points
(δ1, φ1, δ2, φ2) on the globe as
d(δ1, φ1, δ2, φ2) = 2rsin
−1
√√√√√√√√√
sin2( δ1−δ2
2
)+
cosδ1cosδ2sin
2(φ1−φ2
2
)
During experiment e1, the redirector found good servers for 7173 clients, saving
over 15.5 million miles, or an average of 2203 miles per redirected client. Experi-
ment e2 saved on average 3570 miles for its 7303 clients.
The distribution of distance saved per client over both experiments is shown in
Figure 3.5. There appear to be two distinct peaks in the distribution: one between
zero and four thousand kilometers, and one at 8000 kilometers. The former cor-
responds to redirection within the United States, and the latter is players being
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of distance savings in kilometers
redirected across the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean. Also notable is the small percent-
age of clients whose latency was negatively impacted by redirection. As a sanity
check for our experiments, we investigate the redirects which negatively impacted
client latency as measured by King in experiment e1. Figure 3.6 shows that these
occur predominately in areas close to the server location as expected.
Latency
To better capture the relationship between geographic miles saved and network
latency, we again use the King tool [53]. For simplicity, we focus on experiment
e1 where the regions (continents) have well-known names. For this experiment,
King was able to determine the latency between 61% of the redirected clients and
servers. Using King we compute the latency between each redirected player and
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Figure 3.6: Bad redirects for experiments e1 and e2
Continent Distance Latency Latency Distance
Sample Size Sample Size (ms) (mi)
Europe 1914 787 46.97 4456.18
N. America (West) 1689 1215 -10.01 -1.42
N. America (East) 2614 1901 13.38 1017.07
Asia 574 223 75.23 4981.10
Australia 77 69 -15.77 5889.95
S. America 180 107 153.14 5421.81
ALL 7069 4318 19.39 2203.22
Table 3.2: Average latency and distance reduction for redirected players for exper-
iment e1
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our server and the latency between the player and the server they were redirected
to. Table 3.2 summarizes the latency and distance reductions of redirected players
for the server, as well as the available sample sizes.
The latency savings per player are modest to small for players in nearby regions
and relatively large for players in faraway continents. While the bulk of clients
are affected favorably by redirection, a fraction are very adversely affected. The
majority of clients come from Europe and North America. As the table shows, the
clients in regions furthest away from the server (Europe, Asia) benefit most from
redirection, whereas clients in the same region as the server receive little (if any)
latency savings. Indeed, while European clients save on average 47 ms of latency
and 4456 miles, clients in North America West frequently get redirected to servers
(slightly) further away than our own.
The correlation between distance and time saved is inexact. Typically, as millions
of meters are saved, so are tens of milliseconds. In Figure 3.7 we show a scatter
plot of distance versus latency, and the linear regression line. The graph shows
the continent gap between 4 and 6 million meters and a large number of outlaying
data points. We attribute these outliers to clients who are geographically distant
but extremely well connected to other continents, errors from the King tool, or
errors from our geographic database.
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Figure 3.7: Plot of distance versus latency for both experiments
Analysis
Next we contrast the algorithmic complexity the status quo client connection pro-
cess versus of our redirection scheme in terms of network connections over time.
The simpler case is the status quo: if we let h be time in hours, c the number of
clients connecting per hour, and s be the total number of servers, then the status
quo has chs connections from clients probing servers, as each client must in the
worst case probe all servers. Once a good server is located, the client must connect,
adding another ch network connections, for a total of chs+ ch, or O(csh).
For the redirection service we consider service maintenance and client connections
separately. Our service must maintain a list of good servers per region. There are
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two portions to this maintenance: daily scanning, and continual updates. Daily
scanning involves sh
24
probes. For continual updates, let the number of probes per
hour per region be u and the number of regions r. Then the total maintenance
probes is uhr. What is the value of u? In the worst case, we must probe all the
servers in each region to find good servers, and u = ks
r
for some constant k. In our
implemented system k = 12, as regions were maintained 12 times an hour. Thus
the worst-case hourly maintenance portion of the system requires ksh probes.
The second source of network probes comes from clients connecting to the service.
They make one network connection, the service makes j connections on their behalf
where j is the constant number of servers maintained per region, and they are sent
to the appropriate server for a total of j + 3 connections. Therefore client connec-
tions amount to ch(j+3) connections. This gives a total worst-case complexity for
the service of O( sh
24
+ksh+chj+3ch), or, rearranging terms, O(( 1
24
+k)sh+(3+j)ch)
which is equal to O(sh + ch). This is a substantial improvement over O(csh) for
large numbers of hours, servers, and clients.
Moreover, the expected number of connections is substantially smaller. While
the worst-case number of maintenance probes per hour per region was ks
r
, the
observed expected case is 2kj: on average 2 probes per good server. This is due to
the large number of empty servers and server stability. This brings the expected
total number of connections to O( sh
24
+2kj+chj+3ch). While this does not impact
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the algorithmic complexity (still O(sh + ch)), it removes the constant factor of k
from the server term, an improvement of hundreds of thousands of connections per
hour in the real world.
3.2.4 Conclusion
We have presented a redirection service for game servers that improves the public
server experience for clients by addressing the problem of finding a good server
without incurring the time or efficiency costs of probing all available public servers.
Our technique is to centralize the polling process, divide the world into geographic
regions and direct clients to nearby servers with low latency, as established with a
third-party latency measurement tool, King. Unique to this service is the ability
to connect clients to servers that meet specific server rule criteria.
The redirection service has certain limitations. It groups players and servers by
geographic region, which means that (1) players from different regions will never
play together, and (2) the service may perform poorly for regions where network
latency and geographic distance between clients and servers are especially nega-
tively correlated. A limitation of our evaluation is that we also rely on the King
tool heavily in verifying the benefits of redirection. Our results using King with re-
gards to likelihood of a valid lookup, as well as consistency of latency from lookup
to lookup are somewhat contradictory with the results shown in the King paper.
69
We would like to perform a more rigorous analysis of the usefulness of King with
respect to the gaming population.
3.3 Public Server Games and Persistent Content
3.3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we have discussed the challenge of hosting an on-line game in terms
of resource provisioning, and in this chapter we have presented a promising alter-
native to client/server hosting for GameCorp: the public server model, where the
users provide hosting resources for the game. Two drawbacks of the public server
architecture are the difficulty of getting clients and servers connected (addressed
in the previous section) and the typically less “massive” experience of playing the
game on a small server. This second limitation is closely tied to the issue of per-
sistent content sharing between servers, as a large number of servers trusting each
other and acting together as a game host can present the illusion of massive world.
Indeed this is typically how commercial MMO’s are architected. In this section
we present an architecture for hosting a MMO game with persistent content in a
public server setting.
A public server system has two benefits that we would like to bring to GameCorp.
The first is that it shifts some of the burden of hosting onto the game players. The
second is user-generated content. In addition to the challenge of hosting a game,
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Game User Architecture Persistent
Content
Typical MMO Client-server X
Typical FPS X Public server
Typical RTS Peer-to-peer
Second Life X Client-server X
Neverwinter Nights X Public server
PS MMO X Public server X
Table 3.3: Game architectures
persistent on-line games require an enormous amount of content generation to
keep subscribers playing. If the game is lacking in novel activities or progression,
avid gamers will become bored and unsubscribe. In stark contrast to a linear
single-player game that can be mastered in dozens of hours, publishers would like
MMO players to be able to enjoy their game indefinitely, regardless of how much
time they put into the game. Thus, continuing content development is critical to
the longevity of a MMO. Unfortunately, novel content is typically developed by
the publisher at a slower rate than it can be played through, resulting in bored
gamers. Some games, such as Second Life and public-server games like Half-life
are designed to allow user-generated content or mods that extend the lifetime of
the game considerably.
Table 3.3 summarizes the state of on-line gaming with respect to user-generated
content, architecture and persistence. Only Second Life allows for user generated
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content along with a persistent world, but it takes place in a client-server architec-
ture. Our solution to the hosting and content creation challenges posed by MMO’s
is to move to a public-server architecture and allow users to generate content.
We call this architecture Public Server MMO (PSMMO). The intended goal of
PSMMO is to inexpensively scale hosting resources and content generation with
the number of users playing the game. This PSMMO architecture introduces some
fundamental challenges that this section addresses: (1) trust and authentication
(2) content creation and (3) content distribution and exchange. We address these
issues using a combination of incentives and public-key cryptography.
The rest of the section is outlined as follows: In Section 3.3.2 we discuss work
related to ours, in Section 3.3.3 we discuss user resources, in Section 3.3.4 we
present our PSMMO design, and in Section 3.3.5 and Section 3.3.6 we share our
conclusions.
3.3.2 Related work
A number of solutions have been proposed in recent years to address the problem
of hosting MMO’s. One solution is to dynamically host games in an on-demand
fashion and take advantage of economies of scale and differences in gaming popu-
larity in a centralized or grid-based fashion [46, 81]. We believe these efforts to be
synergistic with our effort to harness user resources.
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Another approach is to use clients to form a P2P network responsible for gameplay
computation as well as storage [51, 45, 55]. Our solution is not P2P, but rather
public server, which incurs certain trade-offs. While P2P networks are an attrac-
tive solution due to their scalability properties, they typically introduce increased
latency for multi-hop tasks such as peer routing. Additionally some game play-
ers are unable or less able to participate in a P2P network due to firewalls and
discrepancies between upload and download speeds in home networks.
3.3.3 User Resources
Quantity
The merits of our design rest on the willingness of gamers to contribute their
resources and creative energy to the betterment of a compelling game. There is
some empirical evidence that this willingness exists for popular public server games.
Figure 3.8 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the percentage full
of all Half-life 2 servers as polled every 10 minutes from 05/24/2006 to 05/29/2006.
This figure shows that even though Half-life 2 is an enormously popular game
with over 100,000 concurrent players at any moment, the user-contributed server
resources are 70% idle. This represents over 18,000 idle Half-life servers.
In addition to being willing to contribute server resources, players are also keen to
contribute game content. In a public server game the players typically have access
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Figure 3.8: CDF of public server utilization for Half-life 2. 70% of all servers are
empty.
to the art for the game in addition to the server binaries, and so publishers often
allow players to easily modify and extend the art and gameplay. As examples of
user interest in content creation, the developers for Half-life and Neverwinter Nights
have released 6 and 7 official gameplay additions and variants, respectively. Their
user bases however have created at least 492 and 4372 gameplay additions [89,
50]. As another example, Second Life is a MMO that has minimal developer
content; most of the gameplay is emergent behavior generated by user behavior and
user-driven content creation. Linden Labs estimates that of the 80,000 aggregate
hours per day users spend in Second Life, 25% of user time is spent on content
creation [67]. One concern is that users generate too much content and that it may
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be challenging to locate the high-quality additions. While a content rating system
would help to solve this problem, we believe that the social nature of persistent
on-line games will cause gamers to gravitate towards compelling content without
any publisher-sponsored rating system.
Quality
User resources may be plentiful but their overall utility to game popularity is
less easily quantified. Regarding user hosting, the computational requirements for
hosting MMOs are not well known due to the closed nature of successful industry
games. While users are willing to contribute servers for games with dozens of clients
such as Neverwinter Nights, it is unknown what sorts of gameplay sacrifices would
be required to allow user machines to host compelling MMO gameplay. We do
not address this issue in this paper and instead assume that any desired gameplay
can be hosted in some way by user-contributed server resources. We also do not
address public server reliability or response time fairness to clients, and instead
assume that whatever service a given client requires is replicated in depth, as is
the case for Half-life players searching for popular varieties of gameplay.
Regarding quality of content we note that user content can be extremely popular:
the Counter-strike and Capture the Flag modifications for Half-life and Quake have
been more successful than any publisher-generated content.
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As successful on-line games can be profitable and very important to users, there
are certain legal and ethical challenges inherent in harnessing user resources for
profit, such as intellectual property rights and server liabilities. We believe these
issues are important, but we also believe that users enjoy contributing building
blocks to their gaming world, and assume that some legal or monetary resolution
for these issues can be achieved that enables the harnessing of user resources for
scalable persistent worlds.
3.3.4 Design
We preface our design discussion with a more in-depth description of the tasks
and motivation involved in playing a MMO. The generic case of MMO gameplay
involves controlling a single avatar with a set of abilities and performing tasks in
world that advance the power, possessions and abilities of the character. These
gameplay tasks can vary widely based on the genre of the game, from rescuing
hostages to competitive fighting to killing monsters. Successful completion of the
tasks generates rewards that slowly advance the state of the character. While a
new character begins the game with only a few abilities or possessions, as a reward
for hundreds or thousands of hours of playing the game the character typically has
dozens of abilities and hundreds of possessions.
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From the perspective of a gameplay host, these various aspects of persistence (abil-
ities, possessions, and levels) are all alike in that they grant the player additional
gameplay effects. Because of this, and in order to maintain generality, we refer to
any persistent advancement a character can achieve as that player receiving loot.
The substantial investment in time played and tasks completed typically means
that players are very attached to their loot, and very interested in how to get
better loot.
Because acquisition of loot is a primary motivator for persistent on-line games, we
choose to focus our design on loot instead of gameplay. This is not to downplay
the importance of gameplay, but rather to allow the publisher and community
complete freedom to create whatever sort of game they would like and maintain a
valid reward structure. As important as loot is to individual players, the assurance
that a player’s loot was earned fairly is of critical importance to the community’s
confidence in the virtual economy and the lifetime of the game.
The three key participants in our design are the clients, public servers, and pub-
lisher. Figure 3.9 shows each of the three participants and their general role in
the architecture: the publisher handles player authentication, billing, global game-
play functions such as chat, and loot distribution to servers, who handle gameplay
interactions with clients. In the rest of this section we present our architecture
by focusing on the three challenges it strives to meet: authentication, persistent
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content, and trading.
Figure 3.9: Participants in PS MMO
Authentication
One central challenge in a public server MMO is authentication and trust. Since
clients are paying a subscription, the loot server must be able to authenticate
clients. All participants must be able to verify loot as authentic and trust that a
given client is allowed to possess it. To meet these needs, we generate the following
pairs of keys: each client i keeps a private key cl privi, with public key cl pubi
stored by the publisher. The publisher advertises a master loot key loot pub but
keeps loot priv secret. Finally, the publisher keeps a key pair bind pubi, bind privi
for each client i, advertising the public bind key. Generally, cl privi is used to
authenticate the client to the authentication server, loot priv to sign loot, and
bind privi to bind loot to a given player.
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A different but related authentication problem arises from our incentive-based
loot distribution model, which grants loot based on the number of player-minutes
accumulated per server. The loot server needs to verify that player-minutes are
not being granted to a server without a player actually present on the server. One
could imagine, for instance, a player and public server colluding to accumulate
player-minutes every minute of the day even when the player was away from the
computer. We authenticate player-minutes with the use of periodic CAPTCHA
tests that are known to be challenging for computers but easy for humans [88].
While CAPTCHA design is outside the scope of this work, we believe the goal of
the tests should have an additional component aside from differentiating humans
and computers: differentiating gamers from other humans. A game world has a
unique environment and set of rules; it should be relatively easy to place some of
this context into the CAPTCHA, for example with an image from the game. By
binding the player to the domain of our game we can deter work-arounds such as
CAPTCHA farms or CAPTCHA redirects.
Persistent Content
A second challenge for a public server MMO is persistent content creation and
security. We first discuss persistent content creation and distribution. Our design
is that the user community and publisher create content of two sorts: gameplay
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content such as the environment with which the player interacts and the available
actions, and persistent content such as items or abilities that are intrinsic to the
player and modify their appearance and gameplay. The community and publisher
have complete freedom to design gameplay content, but persistent content must
be reviewed and balanced by the publisher before being admitted to the game.
Persistent content is issued to the public servers according to accumulated au-
thenticated player minutes logged at the server. The public server receiving loot
dispenses the loot according to its gameplay rules, which could vary widely. For
example the gameplay could require players to compete against each other in a
tournament, with all the combined authenticated player minutes going towards
a prize for the winner. The server could distribute loot according to the defeat
of computer-controlled scripted encounters, or randomly, or only to certain peo-
ple. While the potential for abuse is clear in such a system, we believe that as
users can vote with their attention for different servers, they will tend to grav-
itate towards fair servers with compelling gameplay. This is the case for other
public server communities such as Half-life where servers that allow cheating are
eventually abandoned.
The security of distributed content is ensured with the bind keys (bind privi, bind pubi)
and the master loot keys (loot pub, loot priv). A given piece of loot is signed with
loot priv and signed again with bind privi for client i, and then given to the client.
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The client can present this loot at any public server or to any client for verification.
No other client j can forge loot without knowledge of loot priv or bind privj. This
enables each client to store its own loot locally. One drawback of this design is
that a player can never trade or lose an item. We will describe a way to relax this
constraint later.
Figure 3.10: Player interactions with public server and publisher during normal
gameplay
Figure 3.10 shows an overview of the player interactions with the publisher and
public server during normal gameplay. The player is initially authenticated with
the publisher as a subscribed gamer and receives a play token good for play on
the desired public server for a certain period of time. That public server’s credit is
recorded by the publisher. Using the play token, the player authenticates itself to
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the public server and plays the game. When loot is distributed, the public server
requests the item from the publisher, who signs it and debits the public server’s
account. The public server then gives the player the item.
Trading
Figure 3.11: Example of how trading alters signatures on items
The trading of items is a backbone of many persistent worlds, but prohibited in
our design so far. We would like to allow trading in a way that does not permit
item duplication. The core of the problem is that once an item is traded between
parties it should not be possessed by both parties. As PSMMO uses cryptographic
signatures to indicate item authenticity and ownership, we need a way to invalidate
ownership. In public key cryptography this problem is called certificate revocation
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and the typical solution is a certificate revocation list (CRL): a list kept by an
authority listing invalid certificates. For PSMMO, this solution requires (1) fre-
quently checking the CRL for freshness and (2) maintaining a CRL for all items
for all players over the history of the game. We propose to avoid the scalabil-
ity problems associated with such a list by establishing a globally synchronized
trading session in which all items in the game are re-issued according to a new
loot priv, loot pub master loot key pair. The publisher would host a global market
for persistent items, with players able to bid on items or establish trades in the
time period preceding the trading session. No actual trading would occur however,
until the trading session, during which each player would have his items re-issued
according to whatever trades had been agreed upon. Figure 3.11 shows a pair
of players with their items before and after the trading session, where they each
possess the other’s items. As the loot key has changed, the old items are no longer
valid.
Our scheme requires the periodic re-signing of all items in the game to a new
master loot key. What is the computational cost of that task? To scale trading
with the number of subscribers, the publisher must possess resources capable of
performing the signing task for all users in a given window. The free cryptography
library crypto + + reports signature and signature verification times of 4.75ms
and 0.18ms respectively for the RSA1024 public-key cryptography scheme on a
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2.1GHz Pentium 4 [69]. Assuming each user has 100 items, and each user’s items
are processed (verified and signed) once, the Pentium 4 would then process 90,947
users in a 12 hour period. This gives a simplistic overview of the cost of the signing
task, but it should be noted that re-issuing each item can be performed in parallel
and can be performed lazily upon authentication. Computation time for signing
can be further reduced with dedicated hardware support.
3.3.5 Discussion
As our design can accommodate a variety of persistent games, it may be helpful
to present an example game, called Smite. In this imaginary game each player
controls a fantasy character in a universe whose gameplay consists primarily of
smiting monsters, collecting treasure and learning new abilities. In the beginning
of the game, players have a default set of abilities that let them smite the lowest
level monsters. The publisher has set up a loot server, authentication server, and
possibly some other globally servers to address global functions such as chat, trade
or movement between servers. Users have set up Smite gameplay servers of all
sorts representing different parts of the world or different activities in the world,
and catering to different levels of player. In order to advance in Smite, a player
must convince a server to issue loot to the player, by completing gameplay tasks on
the server. The server may choose to guarantee that every monster on the server
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drops loot when killed; in this case the server will only display a monster when
it has enough authenticated player minutes to give loot to the monster as well.
Or the server may choose to spawn monsters and determine if they have loot or
not when they are defeated. Certain servers may grant loot to players who pass a
gameplay challenge such as platform hopping, or to players who beat other players
in a head-to-head challenge such as chess. The restrictions imposed on user created
Smite servers are that they can only issue approved loot, and they can only issue
loot in accordance to cost in player-minutes.
The focus of our design is on working persistent content into the public server
model in a way that allows authentication of players and items, and the intended
benefit is decreased hosting costs and content creation costs. A first limitation of
our model is the use of clients to store persistent data. In this situation, the burden
of backups, sharing and synchronizing data between different locations is on the
client. We see two other primary sources of limitation: abuses of the unmonitored
channel between clients and public servers, and scalability of the publisher’s central
authentication role.
Regarding hosting scalability, it should be noted that the publisher’s hosting and
content costs do increase with the number of users as the publisher must orches-
trate whatever global gameplay tasks exist, such as the trading market or global
chat functions. Similarly, the content balance review process that controls loot
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admission into the world becomes more laborious with the number of users. Thus
one limitation of our design is that we merely reduce the load on the publisher.
Regarding client and public server collusion, we believe our system incentives work
against widespread abuse. The incentives in our system are (1) people who con-
tribute servers want them to be utilized by players and (2) players want to acquire
loot and to have fun. As an example of abuse, a hacked public server could have
special rules granting the server administrators powers or special non-authentic
loot. However a persistent social world such as a MMO comes implicit with a
social reputation system, and in the long run we believe players will tend to avoid
cheating servers. Similarly, servers and clients could collude to receive loot with-
out performing any meaningful gameplay tasks (i.e. clients log into an empty
room, answer periodic authentication queries, and eventually leave with loot), but
we believe players will instead gravitate towards servers with compelling content.
As a final example, servers could allow non-authenticated players to play on their
server, although they would lose the incentive of gaining credit with the loot server.
This leads us to one form of abuse that players could have incentives to gravitate
towards: a free service that was not subscription based, but rather ran on user-
contributed hardware and simply copied the approved content from the paid service
game as it came out. As the bulk of the artistic content is available to clients and
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the server binaries are also available in our model, we do not believe there is a sim-
ple solution to this problem. However as these copycat publishers become popular
they also become easier to locate and shut down legally. Furthermore, the cost of
taking the publisher’s role is not trivial even if the copycats do not have to perform
the content balance.
3.3.6 Conclusion
Current MMOs are extremely popular but are costly to host and require an enor-
mous amount of ongoing content creation to keep subscribers happy. The public
server architecture offers an alternative that harnesses user resources to host and
author content. We focus our design on the management of persistent content
(loot) across public servers. The challenges of the public server architecture we
address are authentication, persistent content creation and distribution, and game
balance.
Our design uses a central authority (the publisher) and is incentive-based. Play-
ers want better items, abilities, and other forms of persistent upgrades to their
character, while servers want popularity and to distribute valuable upgrades. The
key mechanism for both of these incentives is that loot is distributed from the
publisher to user-run public servers based on accumulated player-minutes logged
at that server. Once issued, loot is stored on the client and cannot be forged as it
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is signed with cryptographic keys.
Our incentive-based design has certain limitations, such as requiring clients to store
and backup their own persistent content and allowing for collusion between players
and servers for short-term benefits. More broadly, our design ignores the substan-
tial difference between the high level of performance and reliability of modern
centralized MMOs and the more modest hosting characteristics of a single public
server. We assume the overabundance of public servers can be used to form a
similar high reliability and performance system for MMO gameplay. Future work
would provide a design for this, in addition to meeting other challenges such as a
system for exchanging players between servers according to game rules, a reputa-
tion system for public servers, and a more elegant solution for trading authentic
content other than completely re-issuing all content.
Within these limitations, the PSMMO model is a cost-effective architecture for
GameCorp to consider when launching the next persistent on-line game, as it has
the advantage of harnessing user resources to effectively scale. Games are becoming
more popular, resource intensive, and expensive to author and maintain; we believe
user-generated content and user hosting will allow games to flourish in the years
to come.
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Chapter 4
Cheating in On-line Games
4.1 Introduction
One issue GameCorp must concern itself with is cheating in on-line games. Cheat-
ing in games of all sorts has existed as long as games have had rules. Cheating
is not always a bad thing. By violating the rules of a game, cheaters can add a
handicap to an unfair match-up, test the observational power of their opponents,
or spice up an otherwise dull experience. In society at large, cheating at a game
with little at stake (such as solitaire) is generally viewed as more acceptable than
cheating at games with a great deal at stake (such as casino gambling or political
elections).
Cheating in video games is also well-grounded in tradition. Most single-player
games are released with “cheat codes” that allow players to bypass difficult content
or gain abilities that the game was not originally designed around, or simply add
interest to a game that has been otherwise fully explored. However, cheating in
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computer games has become more of an issue in the past decade as the Internet
has enabled people in disparate locations to compete or cooperate together in the
same game. As opponents have become more anonymous and remote, the focus on
competitive gameplay over camaraderie or relaxation has increased. Indeed, there
now exist tournaments with thousands of dollars at stake for competitive players
of on-line games.
Recent years have seen an increased interest in the research community in address-
ing the problem of cheating in on-line games [91, 6, 9, 20, 56]. Several differing
taxonomies of cheating have been proposed to categorize the large body of existing
cheats [61, 54, 24, 92]. Some research has addressed the issue of ordering events in
a peer-to-peer game [37] as well as in a centralized architecture [13, 71], while other
work has focused on preventing lookahead cheats and hiding secrets in client-server
games [6, 9, 20, 60]. As work in this area is just beginning, many forms of cheating
are left unaddressed.
We believe cheating to be an impediment to the success of any on-line game,
especially if it is a game based upon competition or takes place in a persistent world
where time and skill are rewarded with advancement. Individuals are motivated
to write and use cheats for their own advancement and in-game rewards, while
companies are motivated to write and use cheats to take advantage of the virtual
markets associated with on-line games. While there is substantial money at stake
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in terms of sales and player subscriptions, cheating has been difficult to prevent.
Indeed, cheats exist for every popular on-line game. We believe players must have
a reasonably sound and cheat-free gaming experience before they will be satisfied.
In this chapter we present a survey of cheats in on-line games and introduce the
concept of a game’s control path: the flow of game commands and information from
the player to the server and back. We show how each client-side control path cheat
can be decomposed into one of three central issues: information exposure, protocol
manipulation, and game abstraction. We then address the area of information
exposure in RTS games in detail, and present a protected RTS protocol that detects
information exposure cheats in peer-to-peer games.
4.2 A Survey of Cheats
Cheating in on-line games is a major concern [23]. It is prevalent, and according to
two media surveys [31, 77] is the number-one problem facing on-line games. The
impact of cheating is two-fold. First, cheating negatively impacts the popularity
and longevity of games. There have been no comprehensive studies about the
psychological impacts of cheating on the game industry, but anecdotal evidence
suggests that it greatly deters repeat customers (the honest ones suspect that
everyone else is a cheater) and thereby harms industry growth. For games such as
MMO’s in which the legitimate players must play the game for thousands of hours
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to acquire certain virtual goods, the idea that anyone else could acquire those same
goods but bypass the man-years of effort is infuriating to honest gamers.
Secondly, the financial impact of cheats, in many cases, comes out of the pockets
of those who do not cheat. On-line games with a persistent state, in which players
can advance their status over time, inevitably create virtual economies. In these
economies (realized over eBay[28] or customized game-specific markets [49]), play-
ers exchange real-world currency for virtual-world items and characters. Players
who cheat have an easier time acquiring items and can then sell the items to those
who do not cheat.
It is important to have a clear categorization of cheats in order to structure cheat-
ing dialogue and research, as well as plan responses. While some taxonomies have
been proposed by the research community, no taxonomy’s categories are disjoint;
that is, for each taxonomy a given category overlaps with other categories such
that a single cheat may fall into two categories. For example, Yan [92] notes two
categories Exploiting a Bug or Loophole and Abusing the Game Procedure that
have considerable conceptual overlap, as any abuse of the game procedure can be
considered a loophole with the given definitions. We believe a set of disjoint cat-
egories for cheats is an important first step in addressing cheating. Establishing
a set of well-defined non-ambiguous categories for cheating in games can be con-
sidered the first step towards an automatic identification and labeling process for
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cheats.
Previous taxonomies have addressed all games (on-line or single player) and all
forms of cheating. We choose to focus instead on what special forms of cheating
exist for clients of on-line games, apart from other on-line applications such as web
browsing, and apart from other games not played on-line such as dodge-ball. While
cheating can occur at the client or server level (or in the middle of game traffic),
we focus on client cheating. Client cheating is of greater importance as clients
outnumber servers and servers for games are frequently trusted authorities who
also handle client financial and authentication information. The cheats we focus
on are those performed by the client on the control path of the game. Intuitively, the
control path is the flow of game commands and information from the player to the
server and back. More formally, we define a generic on-line game G as consisting
of a sequence of control path messages m1,m2, ...,mn where mt is chosen from the
following control path message options:
1. game receives user input message uit
2. game writes network output message not
3. game receives network input message nit
4. game writes display output message dot
Games are complex computer programs and they perform many more actions than
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these such as reading from random number generators or writing to persistent
storage. Those actions, however, do not directly affect the user’s perception of the
game state or the state of game peers until they are used in a control path message,
such as a write to the display or to the network. We limit our focus to these four
actions as they define the information boundaries between the user, the game, and
the network as shown in Figure 4.1 We define a control path cheat to be any control
path message not achievable by the publisher software and its unmodified software
dependencies that gives the player an advantage. The somewhat cumbersome def-
inition is intended to classify cheats along the control path together regardless of
what level of the software hierarchy they are performed at. For example, if a cer-
tain control path message gives a player an advantage, we wish it categorized as a
cheat whether it was generated by altering the client’s random number generator,
or by altering the game’s binary, or some operation at another layer. Given the
definitions above, we can categorize on-line game cheats into four disjoint classes:
Information Exposure, Abstraction, Protocol Manipulation, and Out-of-path.
At this point we first note two important limitations of our definitions. First,
anything achievable by the publisher software is not classified as a control path
cheat, and therefore we categorize any software bugs or design errors as out-of-
path. For example, if during the course of normal gameplay players can create
a duplicate of an item by dropping the item and then picking it up rapidly, we
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Figure 4.1: Control path for a generic on-line game
categorize this as an out-of-path design flaw. If on the other hand, an item can
be duplicated via a sequence of messages that cannot be generated via the game
interface, we classify this as protocol manipulation. Second, we classify effects,
not original causes; for example, if a cheat writes a message to the network giving
the player an advantage, we do not further classify what caused the write, which
could have come from a modification of a game data file, a bug introduced into
a random number generator or any other source. This means that there may be
several different implementations of the same cheat.
4.2.1 Information Exposure
A cheat falls into this category when it reveals to the players information which
they could not have access to, but is available on their machine. In our control path
model, we define information exposure as a display of information not available
to the user. For example, in RTS games, the “fog of war” is supposed to hide
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areas of the world which have not been scouted out by player-controlled units. A
maphack cheat removes the fog of war, revealing the entire map. In FPS games,
players must explore a three-dimensional map, trying to find the enemy and kill
them. Part of the game is this exploration process, but various cheats such as the
wallhack circumvent this by making all of the walls semi-transparent, revealing
all players. Other examples of cheats which expose the game’s supposedly secret
information to players include removing “blinding” effects such as smoke or flash-
bang grenades, revealing the contents of treasure chests before opening them, or
revealing a deck of cards. Information exposure cheats operate at the level of the
knowledge of the game state.
4.2.2 Game Abstraction
Cheats in this category are those that have abstracted the game away to something
simpler, and allow the users of the cheat to play this much simpler game against
their opponents (who must play the difficult game). We divide game abstraction
further into two subcategories: Abstraction of Input, defined as writing user input
or gameplay messages decreasing user interactivity, and Abstraction of Output,
defined as displaying refined information to the user to guide input. Abstraction
of input cheats are often referred to as “botting”. In FPS games, an especially
egregious use of this is the “aimbot” which removes the task of aiming, and causes
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all of the cheater’s shots to hit the enemy. This is not done by altering network
messages to read “I hit you” (another kind of cheat) but rather by reading the
location of enemies from the game and solving a simple formula to compute the
correct trajectory from the velocity and position data. A RTS example would be
a “macro” which handles the management of large armies in single clicks, when
it would take a fair player many clicks. An MMO example from Diablo 2 is the
“get all” cheat, wherein when a monster’s treasure falls on the ground, the cheat
instantaneously picks up all of the loot before other players can react.
Abstraction of output cheats, on the other hand, do not perform user tasks, but
rather filter game information available to the user into a more useful form. Card
counting cheats or cheats that parse and remember large amounts of screen in-
formation and guide the user’s inputs fall into this category, as do cheats that
replace game models or textures, or highlight the best actions for users to select
at a given moment in the game. Abstraction of input and output, while seemingly
very different subcategories can be seen as extremely similar when the abstraction
of output is for example voice synthesis guiding the user’s input.
4.2.3 Protocol Cheats
These cheats use the protocols for communicating with the server and other players
that were defined by the game designers, but take advantage of weaknesses in
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those protocols for the cheater’s benefit. We define protocol cheats as writing
game protocol messages not generable by user actions to exploit weaknesses in
the protocol. For example, Diablo had a network protocol which allowed network
messages of the form “I did X damage to you”, and a cheat came out which simply
sent messages to other players doing damage to them until they were dead, even
when the players were nowhere near each other. In persistent on-line games the
most common version of Protocol Cheating is “item duping”, where a rare or
powerful item is copied thousands of times via a sequence of messages exploiting a
non-transactional game protocol. In RTS games, these cheats can take the form of
manipulating messages and network timing to create extra resources or disconnect
the other player from the game. A more subtle protocol cheat is the “speed hack”,
where a cheater speeds up the rate of sending messages to the server, enabling their
avatar to move more quickly or fire more frequently than normal. In a gambling
example the cheat might take the form of taking the pot before winning the hand.
Protocol cheats operate at the level of the game’s outputs to the server or other
clients.
4.2.4 Out-of-path Cheats
Cheats fall into this category when they are not on the control path from client to
network and back. Due to our definition of control path cheats, we consider any
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game actions performable by unmodified publisher software as intended design.
This leaves many game bugs and loopholes such as game map flaws or extremely
powerful combinations of game abilities not labeled as control path cheats. Even
item duplication can be considered to be an out-of-path cheat if it can be performed
via the unmodified publisher software. We believe these are serious issues, and
ones that can yield interesting research questions and answers, but we believe the
challenge is in detecting those bugs and design flaws before the game is shipped,
at which point such exploits become simply part of the game. Other notable issues
that are not on the control path include those found in all games and those found in
all on-line applications. Cheats common to all games include collusion with other
players, the dealer or game authority, leaving the game early, or lying about the
results of the game. Problems common to all on-line applications include spoofing
and authentication, denial of service and operating system security issues such as
buffer overflows. These are important issues but their scope is beyond that of
on-line games.
4.2.5 Discussion
Our three core categories are disjoint from each other in that while a set of user
actions can be composed of several atomic actions within each cheating category,
no atomic action can belong to two categories. This is the case because the cheating
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Figure 4.2: Abstraction of Input (AI), Abstraction of Output (AO), Protocol Ma-
nipulation (P ) and Information Exposure (E) each occur at certain points in the
control path
action must occur somewhere on the path from the user’s interaction with the game
to the game’s output to the user, and the three categories operate at different points
along that path. As Figure 4.2 shows, Information Exposure operates between
the path from the server to the game, Game Abstraction between the user and
the game, and Protocol Manipulation between the game and the server. While
Abstraction and Protocol Manipulation both send messages to the server, they are
distinguished in that the Protocol Manipulation messages are not normal gameplay
messages.
We have designed our categories to be disjoint so that a given cheating message will
only belong to a single category. We believe this to be an important property for a
categorization, as it allows for the categories and terms to be used unambiguously
in discussion. There are, however, some non-intuitive boundary conditions. We can
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Genre Information Abstraction Abstraction Protocol
Exposure of Input of Output Manipulation
FPS wallhack aimbot texture replacement rejoin hack
RTS maphack macro show best action resource creation
MMO chest hack botting voice suggestions item duping
Poker reveal deck botting show odds take pot
Table 4.1: Examples of cheats in each category for some genres of games
have, for example, a single piece of software performing the same action repeatedly
but resulting in two different categories of cheats. Imagine a cheat that operates
on game message noi on the link between the game and the network and injects
message noi+1, an exact copy, after a delay of 50ms. If the user-generable actions
for the game allow a message every 50ms, a user clicking once every 100ms will
never violate game protocol, and the extra writes on the control path will be
categorized as abstractions of input. If on the other hand, the user clicks more
frequently, there will be violations of the user-generable actions categorized as
protocol manipulations. While non-intuitive, we believe this is justified as there
are two forms of cheating occurring; user interactivity is being decreased via the
bot, and also the actions are being sent more quickly than allowed by the game
client.
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4.2.6 Dealing with Cheats
We believe the three categories of control path cheats to be important areas for
GameCorp to consider in its game design, as well as for researchers to focus their
efforts on. Table 4.1 shows a list of cheats and their categorization based on likely
implementation. In this section we discuss what can be done to address cheats of
each category.
Protocol Manipulation cheats are typically fixed by altering the faulty protocol.
The research challenges in this area of cheating are in automatically finding pro-
tocol errors and proving protocol security. In recent years the research areas of
programming languages [24] and security [6] have begun addressing this challenge.
Information Exposure cheats can be addressed to some degree by game design; in
the popular client-server architecture, the server can hide much of the informa-
tion given to the client. However, performance limitations often require a certain
amount of extra information to be sent to clients. For example, in FPS games
the server typically sends the location of all of the players in the game instead
of just the players visible from a given player’s viewpoint. If network and server
performance were limitless, the server could render each player’s viewpoint directly
and conceal global player locations. The information exposure issue is even more
challenging in peer-to-peer architecture games where restricting sent information
creates opportunities for other cheats. We treat this issue more fully in Section 4.3.
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Abstraction cheats are problematic to prevent for a game played over a network.
At some level, the outputs to a game are always visible and the inputs are always
programmable, either via software or in the extreme case by a robot monitoring the
computer’s output devices and operating the computer’s input devices. Abstrac-
tion cheats are also challenging to detect. While differentiating a computer-aided
game player from a human game player sounds superficially similar to the Tur-
ing test designed to distinguish a human from a computer on the basis of ability
with natural language, we do not believe on-line games can be used as an accu-
rate Turing test. The Turing test focuses on natural language, a skill difficult to
teach a computer, whereas games are designed for fun and are often not espe-
cially challenging for computers. Furthermore, while the Turing test need merely
distinguish between human and computer, game abstraction cheats can achieve
a middle ground where a computer and human operate together. While game
abstraction may not be preventable or detectable in general, we believe that two
techniques can be used to minimize game abstraction cheating: (1) reverse-Turing
tests (CAPTCHAs [88, 76]) designed to test for the presence of a human and (2)
trusted hardware [2]. CAPTCHAs, based on difficult artificial intelligence prob-
lems, demonstrate that the solver is not a completely automated program. Trusted
hardware allows game hosts to believe that the control path from the gamer’s in-
put device to the server is tamper-proof, and that if game abstraction cheating is
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going on, it is occurring at the level of robotics.
4.3 Information Exposure in Peer-to-Peer Games
In Section 4.2 we introduce a top-level categorization of cheats, including the In-
formation Exposure cheat in which cheaters gain access to information available
on their computer but not intended to be revealed. In this section we consider
solutions to this cheat in the context of RTS games. We first show how cheating
can be detected in the simple peer-to-peer game of on-line Battleship with cryp-
tographic bit commitment, and then demonstrate a region-based bit commitment
scheme called protected RTS that decreases information exposure in RTS games.
4.3.1 Background on RTS games
In RTS games, each player acts as a general commanding a set of units in a battle
against another player. Units gather resources, fight each other, or explore the
map. Central to RTS games is the concept of the fog of war : player A cannot see
player B’s unit x unless a unit controlled by player A observes x. Each unit has
a scouting radius and any enemy unit within this radius is revealed to the player.
The player’s vision is comprised of the union of the vision of each of his units, and
everything outside of that area is in the fog of war. This work focuses on maphacks,
a form of information exposure cheating in RTS games where one player runs a
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modified version of the game that eliminates the fog of war and displays the entire
game state, including the other player’s units and move choices, thereby gaining
an extremely large advantage in the game. To our knowledge, this cheat exists for
every popular peer-to-peer RTS game.
The maphack cheat is important due to the strategic underpinnings of the game.
For an RTS game, players typically have a selection of many units to command,
and the games are generally balanced with a “rock, paper, scissors” scheme: one
kind of unit is strong against another kind, but weak against a third. Typically
the games are finished when a player concedes or loses all units. In this context a
maphack, by removing the fog of war for one player, confers an unfair advantage
on the user.
Because of the large number of units involved per player and the financial impact
of hosting client/server games, RTS games are typically played via a peer-to-peer
architecture. Maphacks are prevalent in RTS games because the players exchange
only user input information over the network. Each player’s computer simulates
the complete game individually. This technique of distributed simulation prevents
many other forms of cheating by placing no trust in the other players. For example,
players cannot fabricate units that they did not legally build. However distributed
simulation leaves the complete game state on each computer, leaving the game
open to maphacks.
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Figure 4.3: Example RTS game (Warcraft 3) interface. The map in the lower left
corner shows the player’s units and viewable area.
4.3.2 Related Work and Solutions
The solution to information exposure cheating is to make that information inacces-
sible. In the client-server architecture, the server can readily prevent information
exposure by sending each client limited information. This may not always be
practical, however, due to limitations in the processing power of the server or in
the network performance. Another solution to information exposure is encryption.
This can prevent eavesdropping, but given that the game eventually decrypts the
information, cannot prevent all forms of exposure. An even harder problem is
dealing with information exposure in the peer-to-peer architecture, where there is
no central server to cull information between parties. In general the challenge is
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to develop a protocol that allows secrets that are unknown to one or both parties,
but not allow either party control over the secrets. This topic is addressed in the
cryptography field as the mental poker problem [82, 17, 18, 11, 93], and solutions
to it rely on cryptographic primitives such as bit-commitment, symmetric encryp-
tion and zero-knowledge proofs. While these cryptographic protocols for mental
poker address the sharing and hiding of secrets between peers, they are not directly
applicable to the unit location secrets of map-based games such as RTS games.
In the field of networked gaming research, recent efforts to classify and categorize
cheating in on-line games [54, 61, 91] discuss the problem of maphacks specifically,
but not solutions. Baughman et al apply bit-commitment to secrets in on-line
games in the context of dead-reckoned games and peer-to-peer games [6]. They
introduce a scheme called AS that prevents look-ahead cheats by requiring players
to commit to their moves in advance of revealing them. They also use a zero-
knowledge proof to determine if two players occupy the same general region (cell)
of space without revealing location information. Given the small cell size required
for RTS games and the large number of units, this technique would scale exponen-
tially and is infeasible in this context. Our work builds upon their work by using
bit commitment to hide secrets, but focuses on the challenges of RTS games. Buro
addresses the issue of maphacks in RTS games by presenting a client-server archi-
tecture (ORTS) to perform visibility culling for each player [9]. ORTS does not
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meet our goal of a peer-to-peer architecture and instead requires server resources
for each game played. With hundreds of thousands of RTS games played on-line
per day this solution has scalability issues we wish to avoid.
4.3.3 Protected RTS
Overview
At a high level, our scheme for securing RTS games from maphacks alters the
network protocol from exchanging perfect information about what the other player
is doing to exchanging information based on what region each player can see. We
call the region a player can see his viewable area. We propose to utilize distributed
simulation for actions within each player’s viewable area, but to hide all other
actions. We then secure these other actions from cheats by using bit-commitment
and post-game verification, a technique we discuss first in the simple case of the
Battleship game. Of special interest to us is the fact that in our scheme, each
player knows the other player’s viewable area.
We evaluate protected RTS on two criteria: network impact and reduction in infor-
mation exposure. By exchanging viewable areas, players no longer know the entire
game state, but they do know something about the other player’s units. As de-
tailed below, we quantify this reduction in knowledge as an increase in information
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uncertainty. We then evaluate protected RTS in a user-independent fashion by cre-
ating a model of a generic RTS game and simulating the increased uncertainty and
information loss as we vary the unit density on the map and size of the viewable
area. We demonstrate a substantial reduction in the total information available
and increased uncertainty of unit position. We then perform a user trace-driven
evaluation of protected RTS using actual gameplay traces to establish realistic per-
formance characteristics for a particular RTS (Warcraft III). In this trace-driven
evaluation we find that protected RTS substantially reduces information exposure
and greatly increases bandwidth usage, but that the bandwidth usage still falls
within a usable range.
Preventing Cheating in Battleship
A basic building-block of modern cryptography is bit commitment: a party’s ability
to make a choice without revealing it and then, at a later date, reveal the choice.
Central to the concept is that the committer cannot change his choice after making
it, and that others cannot determine the choice before it has been revealed. We
first demonstrate how bit-commitment can secure the simple game of Battleship
and then we apply it to the more complicated case of RTS games.
In Battleship, each player has five ships placed on a grid. Players take turns
calling out a single grid position and telling each other whether the shot was a hit
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or miss. A player wins when all positions on the other’s ships are hit. Without
bit-commitment, Battleship is easy to cheat at, especially in an environment such
as a networked game. The kind of cheating depends on whether or not you know
the other player’s ship positions. It is assumed that this information would not
be intentionally displayed to the user, but the reality of today’s cheating-heavy
environment is that if the information is available on a person’s computer, someone
will write a program to reveal it.
If player p1 knows where player p2’s ships are, p1 can easily cheat by calling out a
sequence of shots that hit. If, on the other hand, p1 does not know where p2’s ships
are, p2 can cheat by telling p1 that all shots are misses. Player p1 would never be
able to verify that player p2 was cheating.
One simple technique to secure Battleship is to use bit commitment. Each player
pi picks a secret si and a set of initial ship positions spi. Each player then sends
h(si, spi) to the other player where h is a cryptographic hash function. Each player
must take the other’s word when they declare if each shot missed or hit, but at
the end of the game, players exchange (si, spi). They can verify these against the
initial hash, then verify each of the given answers as correct.
Note that the game is not secured in the sense that it is impossible to cheat, but
rather each can verify that the other did not cheat. This is the approach we would
like to take with RTS games as well.
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Preventing Cheating in an RTS game
Our goal is to secure RTS games such that information exposure cheats will be
detected. Detection of cheaters is an adequate goal for on-line games because of
the high level of control held over players. Players are typically authenticated via
a code on their purchased copy of the game to a central server before beginning a
peer-to-peer on-line game. This gives the hosting company the ability to globally
ban known cheaters from playing.
Cheating in RTS games presents more challenges than cheating in Battleship.
Battleship has a few static secrets: the ship locations. RTS games have dynamic
sets of units, each of which has a dynamic location. Some of the enemies secrets are
supposed to be known, and some are not, based on a player’s viewable region. RTS
games thus represent a class of applications in which the secrets are too numerous
and dynamic to secure with conventional cryptographic approaches such as bit
commitment, and are linked together spatially.
Our scheme is designed to minimize network traffic while concealing as much in-
formation as possible about the enemy without permitting cheating. While the
protocol generalizes to a multi-player peer-to-peer game, we confine our discussion
to the simpler two player game for this example. Our scheme is as follows:
Initial exchange: Each player Pi generates an initial game state gsi according to
the game rules. Each player generates a secret si and sends h(si, gsi) along with
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the player’s viewable area v to the other player.
In-game exchanges: For each time slice player Pi performs the following:
1. Send viewable area v
2. Receive opponent’s viewable area v′
3. If current move m is in v′, send it clear-text
4. Otherwise, send h(m, si)
5. If Pi’s units u just entered v
′, send them clear-text
Post-game exchange and verification: After the game is completed, each
player Pi sends si as well as a log of all the moves m for which they sent hashes
h(m, si). Then each player simulates the game with complete knowledge of all
moves and checks the validity of each sent hash, viewable area and unit.
Using this protocol, players can lie about their viewable area, their hashed move,
and what units they control. In the post-game exchange and verification, these
lies will be detected. For this process we believe that the Baughman et al [6]
definition of a logger service for each client to record secret moves is adequate.
Verifying proper gameplay is beyond the scope of this work, but we assume it is
possible given the moves, hashes, and gameplay engine.
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Viewable Areas
The network impact of sending the viewable area could be very large, depending
on its accuracy and representation. The two extremes of representation for a
viewable area are a vectorized representation of units and radii, or a rasterized
representation. As the representation more accurately depicts the location of the
individual units (as in a vectorized representation), the amount of uncertainty
about where the opponents units are decreases. We want to increase uncertainty
and minimize bandwidth overhead, so we believe a rasterized viewable area is
appropriate for RTS games.
We create our rasterized viewable areas from the actual viewable area v of area
s2 by mapping v onto a raster r of k2 bits where bit zero indicates that a raster
element is not viewable and bit one indicates that an element is viewable. For each
element of our raster r(x, y), let r(x, y) = 1 if (bxs/kc, bys/kc) ∈ v, and r(x, y) = 0
otherwise. As a small raster increases uncertainty and decreases network impact,
for our experiments we use a ratio of s to k of 64:1, and we vary the unit density
by varying the number of units instead of changing the size of the raster.
Non-repudiation
The protocol as presented is sufficient for a player to know if a game was played
fairly at the verification step. To meet the larger goal of proving to another party
113
that cheating took place, each player must have a public and private key pair.
The natural place to store the public keys would be at the authentication server
for the game. To alter the protocol to allow for provable cheating each player Pi
must send an additional message during the in-game exchange: a signed, dated
cryptographic hash of the player’s message (v,m|h(m, si), u) for that time slice.
By cryptographically signing each message sent with a player’s private key, players
can achieve non-repudiation; a player can prove that another player cheated if and
only if cheating actually took place. This technique enables the central authen-
tication server to ban cheaters, forcing them to buy another copy of the game to
play again.
4.3.4 Evaluation
We first evaluate protected RTS in a user-independent fashion; that is, we ignore
the play characteristics of users in terms of clustering of units and player inter-
action, and instead explore the effectiveness of protected RTS under varying sizes
of maps and number of units. Specifically, we evaluate the impact of the bit-
commitment scheme on three characteristics: the uncertainty it adds, the quantity
of information it loses, and the added cost in bandwidth it incurs. We model our
experiments after the map sizes, unit numbers and proportions used in Warcraft 3.
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Uncertainty
We wish to quantify the amount of information concealed by sending viewable
regions instead of unit locations. One general measure of information is Shannon’s
uncertainty[83], which measures the disorder and unpredictability contained in a
random variable. Shannon uncertainty is defined on random variable x with n
possible values over probability distribution p(x) as
H(x) = −
n∑
i=1
pilog(pi) (4.1)
In order to demonstrate the usage of this formula, imagine a networked game where
a machine transmits a series of k symbols chosen from set (A,B) to the player. How
much information was transmitted to the player, and how much was redundant?
This depends on the probability distribution of the symbols. For example, if the
player receives a series of symbols predominately A’s, the player’s uncertainty
should be small about what the next symbol is. If we calculate the uncertainty
for the distribution of symbols (A = 0.99, B = 0.01), we get the small value of
0.0808. Suppose, on the other hand, the machine transmits symbols A and B with
equal probability. We would like this to represent maximal uncertainty, and if we
calculate the uncertainty of that equal two-symbol distribution (A = 0.5, B = 0.5)
we get one, the maximum uncertainty for a series of two symbols.
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Shannon uncertainty represents the average number of bits required to encode the
series of symbols with the most space-efficient encoding. Thus the theoretical best
encoding for our (A = 0.99, B = 0.01) distribution of symbols would only require
an average of 0.0808 bits per symbol. One can imagine such an encoding has many
short strings of bits representing long strings of A’s, averaging −log(0.99) = 0.0145
bits, and a longer string of bits representing B requiring −log(0.01) = 6.6439 bits.
We can see that on a per-symbol basis, receiving a B represents a larger change
in uncertainty than receiving an A, and this matches the intuition that the B’s
contain more information. Our use of uncertainty as applied to RTS games does
not relate to encoding efficiency directly, but rather to this change in uncertainty.
We apply Equation 4.1 to our protected RTS scheme as follows. We represent
the unit location information in the unprotected version of the game as a raster
containing white pixels for unit locations, and black pixels otherwise. We represent
the protected version of the game as the same raster, but replacing the units with
viewable areas of a given radius. We then calculate the average uncertainty in
both cases, and compare the difference. This difference measures the uncertainty
we have added to the raster. As in our uncertainty examples above, we have only
two symbols in our data (white and black). We evaluate the uncertainty impact
of varying the number of units and the view radius of each unit as outlined in
Table 4.3.4.
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Experiment Map area View Avg. Num
Radius Units
Warcraft 3 112002 860 100
vary-num 6402 49 vary(1-100)
vary-rad 6402 vary(1-100) 6
quant 6402 49 vary(1-100)
overlap 6402 49 vary(1-100)
Table 4.2: Data on experiments performed to quantify uncertainty and information
loss
Shannon uncertainty does not directly correlate to the amount of gameplay infor-
mation hidden (for example, it does not capture the hidden unit types), but it is a
useful comparison as it is completely separate from the meaning of the information
transmitted. While we could model every facet of a specific RTS game in terms
of information hidden or transmitted (unit level, items carried, attributes), this
would bind our analysis more tightly to that specific game. Instead we focus only
on the uncertainty introduced in unit location.
Figure 4.4 shows the amount of uncertainty gained as compared to the uncertainty
in the maphacked version of the game. Experiment vary-num varies the number
of units from one to 100 and leaves the radius fixed at the map proportions of
Warcraft 3. Each point represents the average of 50 uncertainty calculations with
x randomly distributed units. Even at one unit we see a 0.2 uncertainty gain, and
this rises rapidly as we add units. At 20 units we gain the most uncertainty, and
past that we see some noise in the signal as a result of the increased probability
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of unit regions overlapping. By 100 units we see that uncertainty has decreased
back to its initially low starting conditions; at that point, the viewable areas cover
nearly the entire map and the transmitted information is again low.
For experiment vary-rad we vary the radius of the units by an order of magnitude
around the Warcraft 3 radius, while keeping the number of units proportional with
the map size. Figure 4.5 shows a substantial initial uncertainty gain initially even
at a radius of one, with uncertainty leveling off slowly as the radius exceeds 100.
We conclude that the specific radius per unit is less important than the number of
units in the game in increasing uncertainty.
The uncertainty gain from unit radius and quantization is considerable. Our results
indicate that the peak uncertainty of our scheme falls within the bounds of normal
gameplay in terms of unit numbers and viewing radius.
Information Loss
We also present a second metric for evaluating the scheme: information loss.
Whereas uncertainty quantifies the likelihood of guessing the color of a pixel, in-
formation loss quantifies the number of data points that are deleted. For example,
when quantizing a large map into a two by two black and white grid, it is not
possible to represent more than four points, no matter how many points existed
initially. The lost information in our scheme comes from two sources: the dispersal
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Figure 4.4: Uncertainty gain from varying the number of units (experiment vary-
num)
of a unit’s location over an area via its view radius, and the quantization of a large
image into a small one.
We model each of these two sources. For quantization, we scatter points in a large
map, downsample to the small map, and count the number of points. The ratio of
downsampled points to original points is the measured information loss.
For the view overlap, we scatter points in a large map. When we calculate the
viewable area for each point, we disperse its information value (say the constant 1)
throughout its viewable area, but do not add anything to an area that is nonzero.
By summing over the map and comparing to the original amount of information
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Figure 4.5: Uncertainty gain from varying the viewable radius of each unit (exper-
iment vary-rad)
we have measured the information lost to overlap.
We calculate this loss with experiments quant and overlap from Table 4.3.4. Fig-
ure 4.3.4 shows that the information loss from overlap rises more rapidly than
quantization for this map size, but both level off very slowly, and the combined
positional information loss for our scheme is 11% for proportional numbers of units
and map size.
We expect our modeling results show less information loss than trace-driven data
would. This is because it is more common for units in RTS games to position in
clusters instead of randomly, which increases information loss in both quantization
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Figure 4.6: Information loss from quantization and overlap
and overlap.
Bandwidth
To calculate bandwidth requirements over time, we build towards an equation that
determines how much data is sent by one player in a game played up to a particular
instant.
RTS games supposedly happen in “real time”, but in fact they do have turns,
albeit of the high granularity of a millisecond. In theory players could act every
millisecond, but a typical move rate is an action every second, or four to five
per second for especially intensive bursts. Our formal definition for bandwidth
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consumed should therefore scale down to milliseconds, but take into account the
case of no user input for a given time slice.
Let vri be the enemy’s viewable region at time i. We define mi as the player’s
move at the given moment. This move can be considered a string containing the
keyboard and mouse input.
Let
mi =
{ player’s move at time i
 if no move
}
(4.2)
We define smi, the secured version of the move as
smi =
{ mi if mi ∈ vri
h(mi, s) if mi /∈ vri
 if mi = 
}
(4.3)
We define ni, the new units at moment i as
ni =
{ the string of units entering vri at time i
 if no units enter vri at time i
}
(4.4)
Let sign(x) be a function that cryptographically signs string x with a player’s
secret key. We define si, the signature for the message at moment i as
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si =
{ sign(vri, smi, ni)
 if (vri, smi, ni) = 
}
(4.5)
Using these definitions, we can construct the size of the data sent up to time t as
dataSent(t) =
t∑
i=1
|vri|+
t∑
i=1
|si|+
t∑
i=1
|smi|+
t∑
i=1
|ni| (4.6)
The last two summations of this equation are, for infrequent user input, consider-
ably smaller in number of nonzero terms than the first two summations. Addition-
ally, if |vri| is stored as an image, it will likely exceed the data requirements for a
string of user-input, or a signed hash. Users of today’s Internet cannot expect to
send and receive vri every millisecond. Therefore we relax the restriction that the
viewable region be sent every time slice, and instead, send the region every r ms.
This changes the definition to
dataSent(t) =
b t
r
c∑
i=1
|vri|+
t∑
i=1
(|si|+ |smi|+ |ni|) (4.7)
Viewable areas can dominate equation 4.7 if they are large, as they may be sent
frequently regardless of player interaction. On the other hand, if the cryptographic
hashing or signing process is space-intensive, signatures will dominate the equation.
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Replay ID Player 1 Player 2 Date Video Size
r1 mTw_ghostridah SK_Insomnia 9/23/2004 2.82GB
r2 [4K]Grubby WelcomeTo 10/10/2004 2.70GB
r3 HordeOfVad aAa_RouF 11/07/2004 2.00GB
r4 Silvernoma nT4everR[aDK] 11/07/2004 0.94GB
r5 64AMD_Cara SK_Zad 11/29/2004 1.43GB
r6 SK_HeMaN apm70 12/04/2004 2.65GB
r7 SK_Zacard MYM]GoStop 12/05/2004 3.95GB
r8 30GamesADay AzYWaSCrazY 12/13/2004 3.76GB
Table 4.3: User traces of Warcraft 3 games
Figure 4.7: (a) mini-map for replay r1 (b) extracted region and unit information
4.3.5 Trace-driven Evaluation
In the previous section we evaluated protected RTS in a user-independent fashion,
setting aside any gameplay dependent characteristics such as unit clustering or user
event generation that may vary from game to game. We concluded that protected
RTS would generate substantial uncertainty with the addition of each unit (peaking
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at 20 for our map size), and we provided an equation for the bandwidth of protected
RTS. In this section we consider the effectiveness of protected RTS in as realistic
a setting as we can generate without access to the source code for the game.
We more fully evaluate the network and uncertainty impact of our protocol by
driving it from user traces of real-world Warcraft 3 games. These are freely avail-
able for download, and contain the information in them of which actions each user
takes at each moment. They do not contain the viewable area information or unit
positions. However, the replays are meant to be watched within the game engine,
which derives the unit locations and viewable areas. Given access to user game
traces and the appropriate information about unit locations and viewable areas,
we can accurately evaluate the success of our scheme.
One technique to extract the needed data from a replay is to create a video capture
of the replay, decode the video and focus on the “mini-map”, which displays a
small graphic indicating a player’s units and their viewable area. The data is
approximate; the mini-map is a downsampled two-dimensional representation of a
three-dimensional collection of units and necessarily inaccurate. However, we can
draw order-of-magnitude conclusions from this data.
To carry out our evaluation we select eight replays from well-known LAN tour-
nament players whose games were unlikely to carry cheats, due to their in-person
supervision and high profile. It should be noted however that the presence or
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absence of cheats in our traces has little bearing on our evaluation except to the
extent that players with a maphack enabled may move their units more aggres-
sively than non-cheaters. Our selection criteria for these replays included a variety
of game lengths and race selections. The identification information for these re-
plays is summarized in Table 4.3.5. We view each of these replays using the game
engine and record video of the gameplay with a video capture tool designed for
recording games [35]. We then extract each frame of the video, crop it to the small
“mini-map” region of the game’s heads-up display, and perform image analysis to
extract unit and viewable region information. Figure 4.7 shows an example frame
from the mini-map and the corresponding extracted unit and region information.
We evaluate our traces on bandwidth and uncertainty gain.
Bandwidth
There are several unquantified areas of the protected RTS protocol: the size of the
viewable areas, the hidden and clear events, and the unit transmission. We first
examine the region information and the unit information in depth.
One of the unknowns in our analysis of the protected RTS protocol is the net-
work impact of sending periodic region information. As an example we show in
Figure 4.8(a) the size of a single game’s viewable regions (player 1’s) encoded in
the PNG format as the game progresses. Figure 4.8(b) shows a histogram of the
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Figure 4.8: (a) Viewable regions for game r1 encoded as PNGs (b) Histogram of
viewable region sizes over all traces
regions over all of our trace data, from which we conclude that most regions are
under one kilobyte in size, and the median region in our traces is of size 647 bytes.
The small peak in the distribution at 300 bytes is due to the equivalent starting
positions for each player at the beginning of a game. To compare these region sizes
with the space required for cryptographic signatures, the size of a signature using
SHA-1 as the hash and RSA-1024 for the encryption is 128 bytes.
Another unquantified aspect of our analysis is the number of units controlled by
each side of the game, and of those, the number who are visible to the other
player over time. In Figure 4.9 we show an approximation of the number of units
controlled by both players over the course of a typical game (r1) of Warcraft 3.
This is only an approximation because it is difficult to deduce if a player-controlled
block of pixels in the mini-map is a single large unit or several small ones, or not
a unit at all but instead a building. In this work we treat buildings as stationary
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Figure 4.9: Number of units over time as extracted from Warcraft 3 replay r1
units, and we choose to over-estimate the number of units by assuming each block
is composed of many units. Figure 4.9 shows the number of units increasing as the
game progresses until a unit cap is reached, and peaking at around three hundred
units for this game.
In our protected RTS scheme the number of units controlled by each side is largely
unimportant except for when the units become visible to the other player, who
must then be informed of their presence. As our trace data gives us access to each
player’s viewable area as well as the location of their units, we can calculate this
quantity of visible units. One limitation of our analysis however is that we cannot
identify units from one frame to the next. In the protected RTS protocol we would
like to only send units that recently became visible to the other player (so as not
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to repeatedly send the same units). Since we cannot distinguish between units by
frame however, we must overestimate the number of units to be sent at each frame.
In Figure 4.10 we view player 1’s perspective for replay r1 and show the number
of units inside and outside of player 2’s viewable region. The number of units sent
is sporadic and typically more units are outside of the player’s view than within.
This is due to the nature of the game; many units are visible during a skirmish
with the enemy, but this number quickly decreases as units retreat or eliminate
each other. Looking over all games, we calculate the ratio of hidden units to sent
units to be substantially in favor of unseen units: 6.97:1 on average. Figure 4.11
shows a CDF of the sent units over all traces. 40% of all frames are completely
non-interactive between players, and 66% of all frames involve sending 20 units
or less. We conclude that much of the RTS game takes place sight-unseen by the
other player, and the instances of interplay between the two players are bursty as
opposed to smooth.
The final unquantified bandwidth factor is the event data. Event data is sent
with a mean number of events per second of 3.29. As with the unit data the
ratio of hidden to clear events favors hidden (2.64:1). Given this last piece of
data, we can complete our analysis of the bandwidth impact of our protected RTS
scheme by calculating our scheme’s total bandwidth using a one second window
for transmitting events and viewable areas. Figure 4.12 shows the cumulative
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Figure 4.10: Number of units transmitted in cleartext to opponent over the course
of game r1, player 1
bandwidth of the scheme over the course of game r1 from player 1’s perspective,
broken down into region data, event data, and unit data. The majority of the total
bandwidth is consumed by the region data. The total bandwidth required for the
24.5 minute game is 784 kilobytes. We conclude that the bandwidth impact of our
scheme fits within real-world network characteristics such as DSL.
Uncertainty Gain
Finally, we evaluate the protected RTS scheme using trace-driven data in terms
of uncertainty gain; that is, we measure at each frame of the replay the extra
quantity of entropy present in the viewable regions versus the known regions of
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Figure 4.11: CDF of number of units sent cleartext per frame over all traces
the unprotected RTS protocol. To illustrate the gain over time we show the relative
uncertainty for both the protected and unprotected protocol in Figure 4.13. The
unprotected protocol has relatively constant uncertainty after an early build of
units, while the protected protocol varies more widely but is consistently much
higher. We summarize the gain over all traces in Figure 4.14, which shows a small
peak around 0.1 for the beginnings of traces, and a larger peak around 0.6 for
the rest of the traces. This indicates that the protected RTS protocol introduces
substantial uncertainty into the protocol given real-world parameters.
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Figure 4.12: Cumulative bandwidth of protected RTS scheme
4.3.6 Conclusion
We have presented Protected RTS, a technique for securing on-line peer-to-peer
applications from maphack cheats using bit commitment. In order to scale to a
large number of entities and a rapid network protocol, Protected RTS makes the
following information compromise: players no longer have access to each other’s
complete game state information, but instead have access to an opponent’s view-
able area. We recognize at least three limitations to this technique: it exposes
some information, it detects but does not prevent cheaters, and the detection step
requires a potentially complex verification procedure.
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Figure 4.13: Uncertainty of standard RTS protocol vs. protected RTS protocol for
game r1
The goal of the scheme is to hide information. We have evaluated the total in-
formation hidden using the metric of uncertainty in both user-independent and
trace-driven experiments. Our user-independent evaluation show that varying the
radius of view changes the amount of uncertainty slowly compared to varying the
number of units, and that uncertainty peaks rapidly even for a small number of
units (6 for our map size). The information concealed by our scheme is substantial,
with a total uncertainty increase of .6 seen in our trace-driven evaluation.
While protected RTS substantially increases hidden information, its network per-
formance characteristics must also be suitable for games. We have presented a
model for the bandwidth consumed by this scheme, which depends heavily on the
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over standard RTS protocol
amount of player interaction in RTS games. The conclusion from our trace-driven
evaluation is that the protected RTS scheme introduces a substantial amount of ad-
ditional bandwidth, dominated by the viewable regions and, to a lesser extent, the
cryptographic signatures. However the increased bandwidth required by protected
RTS still fits within modern networking capabilities.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
While on-line gaming is primarily a recreational activity, it shares a great deal in
common with other interactive on-line applications, such as military or disaster
simulations, distance learning, and interactive storytelling and art. Furthermore,
the advances in gaming have historically driven the fields of graphics and networks
forward. Unfortunately on-line games, while increasing in popularity, have be-
come extremely costly to produce and maintain, and popular games are filled with
cheaters. In this thesis we have taken the perspective of GameCorp, an imaginary
company that would like to host a popular on-line game at a minimum of cost.
This thesis has focused on addressing two important issues in networked games:
(1) supporting a huge number of users for a popular game and (2) addressing the
inevitable creation of cheats that come with a popular game. To this end we have
undertaken a number of studies. Specifically, we have:
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1. Completed a novel multi-year measurement study of gamers and game work-
loads based on data collected from a number of unique sources. The study
shows that provisioning for hosting is challenging and users are demanding,
based on the following specific results: (1) gamers are impatient and likely
to leave an unsatisfying game in the first few minutes, (2) game popularity
follows a power-law distribution, with a small number of games being orders
of magnitude more popular than the others, (3) game workloads are very
stable from week to week but difficult to predict over longer timescales and
(4) game workloads are synchronized between games and between games and
other interactive applications such as web traffic. Most importantly, we con-
clude in this study that games are unlikely to achieve substantial benefits
from shared hosting infrastructure across games.
2. Addressed the server selection problem for the public server architecture via
a centralized service that matches a player with a server fitting their criteria.
The two challenging aspects of matching players with servers are (1) knowing
a given server is currently available and (2) knowing that server fits the
player’s latency needs. The status quo addresses this problem via polling;
each player polls all available servers and determines latency, availability and
game rules directly. To centralize the service we must be able to determine
the latency between a given client and server, neither of which are under
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our control. Our approach to this problem is to group servers with clients by
geographic region, and poll potential client server matches with King, a third-
party latency tool. Experimental results show our service saves clients on the
order of tens of milliseconds of latency, but also thousands of kilobit-miles.
Analytic results show our service reduces the number of network probes per
hour from O(n2) to O(n) for a network with n clients and n servers.
3. Designed a new game hosting architecture for a public server MMO (PSMMO)
that frees the publisher from the hosting burden of the client server model
while allowing for a “massive” on-line gaming world and user-generated con-
tent. The PSMMO architecture focuses on persistent content shared be-
tween servers such as new abilities, levels, or equipment, generally called
“loot”. Loot and the public server model do not go together naturally, as
a server cannot verify that a client should have a certain piece of loot, and
a player can set up their own server to issue themselves loot. PSMMO ad-
dresses these concerns with a combination of cryptography, CAPTCHAs and
incentives. The cryptography is used for player authentication and loot au-
thentication, the CAPTCHAs are used to verify actual gamers are playing
the game instead of bots, and incentives are used to motivate servers to pro-
vide interesting content and players to gravitate towards interesting servers.
PSMMO also allows for user-generated content to be incorporated into the
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world in a secure fashion, further harnessing user resources to decrease the
burden of hosting an on-line game.
4. Developed a classification for client-side cheats based on the flow of control of
the game from the user to the game to the network and back. All cheats on
this control path can be classified into four distinct categories: information
exposure, protocol manipulation, abstraction of input, and abstraction of
output. The taxonomy enables game creators to consider the full spectrum
of cheats that are likely to be created should their game become popular.
5. Addressed the maphack, the dominant cheat in peer-to-peer real-time strat-
egy games. In this cheat a player can see information about another player’s
pieces that is intended to be hidden. In a peer-to-peer game secrets about
unit types and locations need to be kept but fabricating hidden data needs
to be prohibited. The traditional approach to solving this problem in cryp-
tography is via bit-commitment: party a sends a commitment to a secret
such as a cryptographic hash without revealing the secret. At a later date a
can reveal the secret and others can verify that the secret and the commit-
ment agree. The challenge in an RTS game is (1) scalability, as there may
be hundreds of units per side and (2) visibility information. Each unit can
see a certain distance, so the enemy units that are secret or visible changes
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from moment to moment in an RTS game as units move. We address this
challenge with a region-based bit commitment scheme in which each player
knows the other player’s visible area. This scheme compromises informa-
tion exposure for scalability. We evaluate exactly how much information is
exposed and how much additional bandwidth is consumed by the scheme
and conclude that it substantially increases uncertainty while falling within
acceptable bandwidth limits for on-line gameplay.
Future Work
The contributions of this thesis are steps towards addressing key challenges of
hosting and cheating in on-line games, but they merely touch on specific problems
in broad areas.
We believe further research into cheating in on-line games is required for on-line
games to thrive. Two ideal results in this area would be (1) a scheme that prevents
client modification of software and (2) a generalized statistical cheat detector for
game servers. The first result would be very powerful in preventing cheating, as
the dominant cheating concern for games is client-side cheats. This result may
be theoretically unachievable, or require enabling compromises such as trusted
hardware. The second result would be less powerful, as any statistical detector will
ride the line between detecting normal players as cheaters, and letting cheaters go.
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However a generalized statistical detector would have the opportunity to detect any
anomalous behavior, even behavior achieved without client software modification.
Examples of such behavior could include game traffic modification in the network
or flaws in the game design being exploited by a few players. As future work, we
plan to work towards these two results.
Continued research into scalable solutions for hosting and maintaining interactive
on-line applications is also needed if these applications are to succeed in the future.
We believe the public server model is especially suited for the future growth of
games, and so our future work in this area involves further developing the public
server model. Our PSMMO architecture has been designed but not evaluated.
We plan to modify an existing public server game such as Quake to conform to
the PSMMO design, as well as create a centralized authority implementation for
tracking player minutes and issuing loot. This will enable us to directly quantify
load on the publisher, as well as provide a reusable service for other public server
games. We also plan to develop a networked reputation system for gamers and
game servers that can disseminate knowledge more efficiently than player social
interactions. The public server model can benefit greatly from such a system, as
the number of gamers and game servers is typically too large for people to track.
As reputation systems are an open research field, it remains to be determined what
techniques will work best for public server games.
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With advances allowing for scalable hosting and content development for games,
and techniques to prevent or detect cheating in on-line games, we believe on-line
gaming will be prepared to grow into a dominant form of entertainment worldwide.
141
References
[1] A. Akkawi, S. Schaller, O. Wellnitz, and L. Wolf. A Mobile Gaming Platform
for the IMS. In Proceedings of Netgames, pages 77–84, 2004.
[2] ”Trusted Computing Platform Alliance”. ”trusted computing group specifi-
cations”.
[3] AMDZone. Valve Releases Hammer Port of Counter-Strike Server. http:
//www.amdzone.com/releaseview.cfm?ReleaseID=1050, 2003.
[4] AMX Mod Developers. AMX Mod Server Plugin. http://amxmod.net/.
[5] G. Armitage. Sensitivity of Quake3 Players To Network Latency. In Internet
Measurement Workshop (Poster Session), November 2001.
[6] Nathaniel E. Baughman and Brian Neil Levine. Cheat-proof Playout for Cen-
tralized and Distributed Online Games. In INFOCOM, pages 104–113, 2001.
[7] T. Beier and S. Neely. Feature-based Image Metamorphasis. Computer Graph-
ics(SIGGRAPH ’92), pages 35–42, July 1992.
[8] BioWare. BioWare’s Neverwinter Nights. http://nwn.bioware.com/, 2006.
[9] M. Buro. ORTS: A Hack-free RTS Game Environment. In Proceedings of the
International Computers and Games Conference, 2002.
[10] Butterfly.net, Inc. Butterfly Grid Solution for Online Games. http://www.
butterfly.net/, 2003.
[11] J. Castella`-Roca, J. Domingo-Ferrer, A. Riera, and J. Borrell. Practical mental
poker without a ttp based on homomorphic encryption. In Thomas Johans-
son and Subhamoy Maitra, editors, Progress in Cryptology-Indocrypt’2003,
number 2904 in LNCS, pages pp 280–294. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2003.
[12] L. Catledge and J. Pitkow. Characterizing Browsing Strategies in the World-
Wide Web. Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, 27(6):1065–1073, 1995.
142
[13] B. Chen and M. Maheswaran. A Cheat Controlled Protocol for Centralized
Online Multiplayer Games. In NetGames, April 2004.
[14] A. D. Cheok, S. W. Fong, K. H. Goh, X. Yang, W. Liu, and F. Farzbiz. Hu-
man Pacman: a sensing-based mobile entertainment system with ubiquitous
computing and tangible interaction. In Proceedings of Netgames, 2003.
[15] M. Claypool, D. LaPoint, and J. Winslow. Network Analysis of Counter-
Strike and Starcraft. In IEEE Internation Performance, Computing, and
Communications Conference, April 2003.
[16] CNN. SoBig.F Breaks Virus Speed Records. http://www.cnn.com/2003/
TECH/internet/08/21/sobig.virus, 2003.
[17] C. Crepeau. A Secure Poker Protocol That Minimizes the Effect of Player
Coalitions, 1986.
[18] C. Crepeau. A Zero-Knowledge Poker Protocol That Achieves Confidentiality
of the Players’ Strategy or How to Achieve an Electronic Poker Face. In
CRYPTO, pages 239–247, 1986.
[19] E. Cronin, B. Filstrup, A. Kurc, and S. Jamin. An Efficient Synchronization
Mechanism for Mirrored Game Architectures. In Proceedings of Netgames,
2002.
[20] Eric Cronin, Burton Filstrup, and Sugih Jamin. Cheat Proofing Dead Reck-
oned Multiplayer Games (Extended Abstract). In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Application and Development of Computer Games Conference, 2003.
[21] M. Crovella and A. Bestavros. Self-similarity in World Wide Web Traffic:
Evidence and Possible Causes. In Proceedings of ACM SIGMETRICS, May
1996.
[22] C.W. Reynolds. Steering Behaviors for Autonomous Characters. In Proceed-
ings of Game Developers Conference, 1999.
[23] S. Davis. Why cheating matters. In Proceedings of the Game Developer’s
Conference, 2001.
[24] M. Delap, Bjorn Knutsson, Honghui Lu, Oleg Sokolsky, Usa Sammapun, Insup
Lee, and Christos Tsarouchis. Is Runtime Verification Applicable to Cheat
Detection? In NetGames, April 2004.
143
[25] DFC Intelligence. Online Game Market is Growing but Making Money is
Difficult. http://www.dfcint.com/news/prjune252003.html.
[26] Mark A. Duchaineau, Murray Wolinsky, David E. Sigeti, Mark C. Miller,
Charles Aldrich, and Mark B. Mineev-Weinstein. ROAMing terrain: real-
time optimally adapting meshes. In IEEE Visualization, pages 81–88, 1997.
[27] E. Castronova. Virtual worlds: A first-hand account of market and society on
the cyberian frontier. In CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618, 2001.
[28] eBay. eBay - The World’s Online Marketplace. http://www.ebay.com.
[29] Electronic Arts, Inc. EA.com. http://www.ea.com/, 2003.
[30] Everquest. EverquestLive.com. http://eqlive.station.sony.com.
[31] F. Yu. Collapse, Death And Re-Birth In The Chinese Online Game
Market. http://www.chinatechnews.com/index.php?action=show&type=
news&id=2480, March 2005.
[32] W. Feng, F. Chang, W. Feng, and J. Walpole. Provisioning On-line Games:
A Traffic Analysis of a Busy Counter-Strike Server. In Internet Measurement
Workshop, November 2002.
[33] W. Feng, F. Chang, W. Feng, and J. Walpole. Provisioning On-line Games:
A Traffic Analysis of a Busy Counter-Strike Server. In Proc. of the Internet
Measurement Workshop, November 2002.
[34] W. Feng and W. Feng. On the Geographic Distribution of On-line Game
Servers and Players. In NetGames, May 2003.
[35] ”Fraps”. ”fraps real-time capture and benchmarking”.
[36] GameSpy Industries. GameSpy: Gaming’s Home Page. http://www.
gamespy.com/, 2002.
[37] Chris GauthierDickey, Daniel Zappala, Virginia Lo, and James Marr. Low La-
tency and Cheat-proof Event Ordering for Peer-to-Peer Games. In Proceedings
of NOSSDAV, June 2004.
[38] Geobytes, Inc. Geobytes Home Page. http://www.geobytes.com/, 2003.
[39] Global Grid Forum. http://www.ggf.org.
144
[40] K. Gummadi, R. Dunn, S. Saroiu, S. Gribble, H. Levy, and J. Zahorjan. Mea-
surement, Modeling, and Analysis of a Peer-to-Peer Workload. In Proceedings
of ACM SOSP, October 2003.
[41] Half-Life Admin Mod Developers. Half-Life Admin Mod Home. http://www.
adminmod.org/.
[42] T. Henderson. Latency and User Behaviour on a Multiplayer Game Server.
In Networked Group Communication, pages 1–13, 2001.
[43] T. Henderson. Observations on Game Server Discovery Mechanisms. In
NetGames, April 2002.
[44] T. Henderson and S. Bhatti. Modelling User Behavior in Networked Games.
In ACM Multimedia, pages 212–220, 2001.
[45] S. Hu and G. Liao. Scalable Peer-to-Peer Networked Virtual Environment. In
NetGames, April 2004.
[46] IBM Corp. On demand business. http://www.ibm.com/ondemand.
[47] IBM Corp. Tivoli intelligent thinkdynamic orchestrator. http://www.ibm.
com/software/tivoli/products/intell-orch, 2004.
[48] IDC. HP utility data center: Enabling enhanced data center agility. http:
//www.hp.com/large/globalsolutions/ae/pdfs/udc enabling.pdf, May
2003.
[49] IGE. IGE: The Leading MMORPG Services Company. http://www.ige.
com/, 2005.
[50] IGN. Neverwinter Nights Vault. http://nwvault.ign.com/, 2006.
[51] T. Iimura, H. Hazeyama, and Y. Kadobayashi. Zoned Federation of Game
Servers: a Peer-to-peer Approach to Scalable Multiplayer Online Games. In
NetGames, April 2004.
[52] Sugih Jamin, Cheng Jin, Yixin Jin, Danny Raz, Yuval Shavitt, and Lixia
Zhang. On the placement of internet instrumentation. In INFOCOM (1),
pages 295–304, 2000.
[53] K. Gummadi and S. Saroiu and S. Gribble. King: Estimating latency between
arbitrary internet end hosts. In Internet Measurement Workshop, Marseille,
France, November 2002.
145
[54] K. Mørch. Cheating in Online Games- Threats and Solutions. In Publica-
tion No: DART/01/03. Norwegian Computing Center/Applied Research and
Development, January 2003.
[55] Y. Kaneda, H. Takahashi, M. Saito, H. Aida, and H. Tokuda. A Challenge for
Reusing Multiplayer Online Games without Modifying Binaries. In NetGames,
October 2005.
[56] A. Kirmse and C. Kirmse. Security in On-line Games. In Game Developer,
July 1997.
[57] B. Krishnamurthy and J. Wang. On Network-aware Clustering of Webclients.
Proceedings of SIGCOMM 2000, 2000.
[58] B. Krishnamurthy, C. Wills, and Y. Zhang. the use and performance of content
distribution networks, 2001.
[59] M. Lewis and J. Jacobson. Game engines in scientific research.
[60] Kang Li, Shanshan Ding, Doug McCreary, and Steve Webb. Analysis of State
Exposure Control to Prevent Cheating in Online Games. In Proceedings of
NOSSDAV, 2004.
[61] M. Pritchard. How to Hurt the Hackers: The Scoop on Internet Cheat-
ing and How You Can Combat It. http://www.gamasutra.com/features/
200000724/pritchard 01.htm.
[62] Edson Manoel et al. Provisioning On Demand: Introducing IBM Tivoli In-
telligent ThinkDynamic Orchestrator. IBM International Technical Support
Organization, December 2003. http://www.redbooks.ibm.com.
[63] Lee Markosian, Michael A. Kowalski, Samuel J. Trychin, Lubomir D. Bourdev,
Daniel Goldstein, and John F. Hughes. Real-time nonphotorealistic rendering.
Computer Graphics, 31(Annual Conference Series):415–420, 1997.
[64] Microsoft. MSN Games. http://zone.msn.com/, 2006.
[65] Microsoft Corporation. Xbox Live. http://www.xbox.com/live, 2003.
[66] mshmro.com. mshmro.com. http://www.mshmro.com/.
[67] C. Ondrejka. People Powered Places: Second Life, Saving Games, and 6
Missing Pieces. In Microsoft Research Tech Talk, August 2005.
146
[68] Online Game Publishers. Private Communication. 2004.
[69] Open Source. Crypto++: A Free C++ Class Library of Cryptographic
Schemes. http://cryptopp.com/.
[70] V. N. Padmanabhan and L. Subramanian. Determining the Geographic Lo-
cation of Internet Hosts. In SIGMETRICS, June 2001.
[71] C. Palazzi, S. Ferretti, S. Cacciaguerra, and M. Roccetti. On Maintaining
Interactivity in Event Delivery Synchronization for Mirrored Game Architec-
tures. In Global Telecommunications Conference Workshops, December 2004.
[72] D. Papagiannaki, N. Taft, Z. Zhang, and C. Diot. Long-term forecasting of
internet backbone traffic: Observations and initial models, 2003.
[73] QStat Developers. QStat - Real-time Game Server Status. http://www.
qstat.org/.
[74] ReliaSoft Corporation. Life Data Analysis and Reliability Engineering The-
ory and Principles Reference from ReliaSoft. http://www.weibull.com/
lifedatawebcontents.htm, 2003.
[75] T. Rhyne. Entertainment Computing: Computer Games’ Influence on Sci-
entific and Information Visualization. Computer, 33(12):154–156, December
2000.
[76] Y. Rui and Z. Liu. Artifacial: Automated Reverse Turing Test Using Facial
Features. In ACM Multimedia, 2003.
[77] S. Kline and A. Arlidge. Online Gaming as Emergent Social Media: A Survey.
http://www.sfu.ca/media-lab/onlinegaming/report.htm, January 2003.
[78] Debanjan Saha, Sambit Sahu, and Anees Shaikh. A service platform for on-
line games. In NetGames, Redwood City, CA 2003.
[79] ”ServerSpy”. ”server spy: Find gamers online”.
[80] S.Gadde, J.Chase, and M. Rabinovich. Web Caching and Content Distri-
bution: A View from the Interior. In Web Caching and Content Delivery
Workshop, May 2000.
[81] A. Shaikh, S. Sahu, M. Rosu, M. Shea, and D. Saha. Implementation of a
Service Platform for Online Games. In NetGames, August 2004.
147
[82] A. Shamir, R. Rivest, and L. Adleman. Mental poker, 1982.
[83] C. E. Shannon. A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System
Technical Journal, 27:379–423, July 1948.
[84] SirBruce. Total MMOG Active Subscriptions. http://www.mmogchart.com/
Chart4.html.
[85] T. Standage. Chasing the Dream. The Economist, August 2005.
[86] Sun Microsystems. N1 Grid – introducing just in time computing. http:
//wwws.sun.com/software/solutions/n1/wp-n1.pdf, 2003.
[87] Valve, Inc. Steam. http://www.steampowered.com/, 2005.
[88] L. von Ahn, M. Blum, N. Hopper, and J. Langford. CAPTCHA: Using hard
AI problems for security. In Proceedings of Eurocrypt, 2003.
[89] Wikipedia. List of Half-life Mods. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List
of Half-Life mods/, 2006.
[90] World of Warcraft. World of Warcraft Community Site. http://www.
worldofwarcraft.com.
[91] J. Yan and H-J Choi. Security Issues in Online Games. The Electronic Li-
brary: International Journal for the Application of Technology in Information
Environments, 20(2), 2002.
[92] Jeff Yan and Brian Randell. A Systematic Classification of Cheating in Online
Games. In Proceedings of Netgames, 2005.
[93] W. Zhao, V. Varadharajan, and Y. Mu. A Secure Mental Poker Protocol over
the Internet. In CRPITS, pages 105–109, 2003.
148
